We provide an empirical analysis of peer prediction mechanisms, which reward participants for information in settings when there is no ground truth against which to score reports. We simulate the mechanisms on a dataset of three million peer assessments from the edX MOOC platform. We evaluate different mechanisms on score variability, which is connected to fairness, risk aversion, and participant learning. We also assess the magnitude of the incentives to invest effort, and study the effect of participant coordination on low-information signals. We find that the correlated agreement mechanism has lower variation in reward than other mechanisms. A concern is that the gain from exerting effort is relatively low across all mechanisms, due to frequent disagreement between peers. Our conclusions are relevant for crowdsourcing in education as well as other domains.

Staff from edX, MIT, and Harvard will present two instructor dashboards for edX MOOCs. Current workflows will be described, from parsing and displaying data to using dashboards for course revision. A major focus will be lessons learned in the first two years of deployment.

The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives with truthful reports. A long-standing concern has been the possibility of uninformative equilibria. For binary signals, a multi-task mechanism achieves strong truthfulness, so that the truthful equilibrium strictly maximizes payoff. We characterize conditions on the signal distribution for which this mechanism remains strongly-truthful with non-binary signals, also providing a greatly simplified proof. We introduce the Correlated Agreement (CA) mechanism, which handles multiple signals and provides informed truthfulness: no strategy profile provides more payoff in equilibrium than truthful reporting, and the truthful equilibrium is strictly better than any uninformed strategy (where an agent avoids the effort of obtaining a signal). The CA mechanism is maximally strongly truthful, in that no mechanism in a broad class of mechanisms is strongly truthful on a larger family of signal distributions. We also give a detail-free version of the mechanism that removes any knowledge requirements on the part of the designer, using reports on many tasks to learn statistics while retaining epsilon-informed truthfulness.

We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest value, and is incentive compatible, so that users can simply report their true values for network access. A revenue pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that they will choose to use prioritization methods that retain the incentive properties on the buy-side. In this way, the design allows for an open architecture. In addition to revenue pooling, the technical contribution is to identify a class of stochastic demand models and a prioritization scheme that provides allocation monotonicity. Simulation results confirm efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization relative to prior methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.

No abstract available.

Developing sensor network applications demands a new set of tools to aid programmers. A number of simulation environments have been developed that provide varying degrees of scalability, realism, and detail for understanding the behavior of sensor networks. To date, however, none of these tools have addressed one of the most important aspects of sensor application design: that of power consumption. While simple approximations of overall power usage can be derived from estimates of node duty cycle and communication rates, these techniques often fail to capture the detailed, low-level energy requirements of the CPU, radio, sensors, and other peripherals.