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Kevin Kochpatcharin

dblp:360/8751 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 33% Systems and software security · 33% Security and privacy of machine learning · 33%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Embedded and real-time systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › code randomization
address randomization
0.712023
Machine Learning Based Resilience Testing of an Address Randomization Cyber Defense · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2023
Network security
moving target defense
0.712023
Machine Learning Based Resilience Testing of an Address Randomization Cyber Defense · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2023
Embedded and real-time systems
real-time security
0.212023
Machine Learning Based Resilience Testing of an Address Randomization Cyber Defense · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

random forest · 1.3long short-term memory · 1.3k-means · 1.3k-nearest neighbors · 0.7k-nearest neighbor · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Machine Learning Based Resilience Testing of an Address Randomization Cyber Defense
abstract
Moving target defenses (MTDs) are widely used as an active defense strategy for thwarting cyberattacks on cyber-physical systems by increasing diversity of software and network paths. Recently, machine Learning (ML) and deep Learning (DL) models have been demonstrated to defeat some of the cyber defenses by learning attack detection patterns and defense strategies. It raises concerns about the susceptibility of MTD to ML and DL methods. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of ML and DL models when it comes to deciphering MTD methods and ultimately evade MTD-based protections in real-time systems. Specifically, we consider a MTD algorithm that periodically randomizes address assignments within the MIL-STD-1553 protocol—a military standard serial data bus. Two ML and DL-based tasks are performed on MIL-STD-1553 protocol to measure the effectiveness of the learning models in deciphering the MTD algorithm: 1) determining whether there is an address assignments change i.e., whether the given system employs a MTD protocol and if it does 2) predicting the future address assignments. The supervised learning models (random forest and k-nearest neighbors) effectively detected the address assignment changes and classified whether the given system is equipped with a specified MTD protocol. On the other hand, the unsupervised learning model (K-means) was significantly less effective. The DL model (long short-term memory) was able to predict the future addresses with varied effectiveness based on MTD algorithm's settings.
Ganapathy Mani, Marina Haliem, Bharat K. Bhargava, Indu Manickam, Kevin Kochpatcharin, Myeongsu Kim, Eric D. Vugrin, Weichao Wang, Pelin Angin, Meng Yu 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.5