EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Maya Schlesinger
dblp:362/2859
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-6848-746XORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 4 · 4 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial ContractsabstractWe study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong impossibility: For submodular reward functions, no randomized poly-time algorithm can approximate the optimal budget-feasible value within \textit{any finite factor}, even with demand-oracle access. This result rules out extending known constant-factor guarantees from either (i) unbudgeted settings with combinatorial actions or (ii) budgeted settings with binary actions, to their combination. The hardness is tight: It holds even when all but one agent have binary actions and the remaining agent has just one additional action. On the positive side, we show that gross substitutes rewards (a well-studied strict subclass of submodular functions) admit a deterministic poly-time $O(1)$-approximation, using only value queries. Our results thus draw the first sharp separation between budgeted and unbudgeted settings in combinatorial contracts, and identifies gross substitutes as a tractable frontier for budgeted combinatorial contracts. Finally, we present an FPTAS for additive rewards, demonstrating that arbitrary approximation is tractable under any budget. This constitutes the first FPTAS for the multi-agent combinatorial-actions setting, even in the absence of budget constraints. Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger |
ITCS | 4 |
| 2026 | Contract Design for Sequential ActionsabstractWe introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that captures sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard setting, a principal delegates a costly project to an agent and incentivizes them via a contract specifying payments for each possible outcome. The novelty of our model lies in allowing the agent to select actions sequentially — after each action, they observe the outcome and decide whether to stop or continue. This framework captures common scenarios in which agents can make multiple attempts to achieve a desired outcome. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger |
SODA | 3 |
| 2025 | Budget-Feasible ContractsabstractThe problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this problem. However, most of these results rely on the assumption that the principal has an unlimited budget for incentivizing agents, an assumption that is often unrealistic in practice. This motivates the study of the optimal contract problem under budget constraints. Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger |
EC | 4 |
| 2024 | On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial ContractsabstractWe study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only the project's outcome (success or failure), and incentivizes the agent(s) using a contract, which is a payment scheme that specifies the payment to the agent(s) upon a project's success. In the multi-agent setting, the project is delegated to a team of agents, and every agent chooses whether or not to exert effort. A success probability function specifies the probability of success for every subset of agents exerting effort. For the family of submodular success probability functions, Duetting et al. [2023] established a poly-time constant-factor approximation to the optimal contract, and left open whether this problem admits a PTAS. We show that no poly-time algorithm guarantees a better than $0.7$-approximation to the optimal contract. For XOS functions, Duetting et al. [2023] give a poly-time constant approximation with value and demand queries. We show that with value queries only, one cannot get any constant approximation. In the multi-action setting, the project is delegated to a single agent, who can take any subset of a given set of actions. Here, a success probability function specifies the probability of success for any subset of actions. Duetting et al. [2021a] devised a poly-time algorithm for computing an optimal contract for gross substitutes success probability functions, and established NP-hardness with respect to submodular functions. We further strengthen this hardness result by showing that this problem does not admit any constant approximation either. For the broader class of XOS functions, we establish the hardness of obtaining a $n^{-1/2+\varepsilon}$-approximation for any $\varepsilon > 0$. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger |
ITCS | 3 |