Understanding the behavior of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents—particularly as task and agent sophistication increase—requires more than simple comparison of reward curves, yet standard methods for behavioral analysis remain underdeveloped in DRL. We apply tools from neuroscience and ethology to study DRL agents in a novel, complex, partially observable environment, ForageWorld, designed to capture key aspects of real-world animal foraging—including sparse, depleting resource patches, predator threats, and spatially extended arenas. We use this environment as a platform for applying joint behavioral and neural analysis to agents, revealing detailed, quantitatively grounded insights into agent strategies, memory, and planning. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that model-free RNN-based DRL agents can exhibit structured, planning-like behavior purely through emergent dynamics—without requiring explicit memory modules or world models. Our results show that studying DRL agents like animals—analyzing them with neuroethology-inspired tools that reveal structure in both behavior and neural dynamics—uncovers rich structure in their learning dynamics that would otherwise remain invisible. We distill these tools into a general analysis framework linking core behavioral and representational features to diagnostic methods, which can be reused for a wide range of tasks and agents. As agents grow more complex and autonomous, bridging neuroscience, cognitive science, and AI will be essential—not just for understanding their behavior, but for ensuring safe alignment and maximizing desirable behaviors that are hard to measure via reward. We show how this can be done by drawing on lessons from how biological intelligence is studied.

Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks—including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight—all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research.These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle.Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS—systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI—as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS.Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.

The recent embrace of machine learning (ML) in the development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) creates serious risks to geopolitical stability and the free exchange of ideas in AI research. This topic has received comparatively little attention of late compared to risks stemming from superintelligent artificial general intelligence (AGI), but requires fewer assumptions about the course of technological development and is thus a nearer-future issue. ML is already enabling the substitution of AWS for human soldiers in many battlefield roles, reducing the upfront human cost, and thus political cost, of waging offensive war. In the case of peer adversaries, this increases the likelihood of "low intensity" conflicts which risk escalation to broader warfare. In the case of non-peer adversaries, it reduces the domestic blowback to wars of aggression. This effect can occur regardless of other ethical issues around the use of military AI such as the risk of civilian casualties, and does not require any superhuman AI capabilities. Further, the military value of AWS raises the specter of an AI-powered arms race and the misguided imposition of national security restrictions on AI research. Our goal in this paper is to raise awareness among the public and ML researchers on the near-future risks posed by full or near-full autonomy in military technology, and we provide regulatory suggestions to mitigate these risks. We call upon AI policy experts and the defense AI community in particular to embrace transparency and caution in their development and deployment of AWS to avoid the negative effects on global stability and AI research that we highlight here.