Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Shihao Xiao
dblp:362/3676
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0001-7085-9142ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational finance and economics · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data integration and cleaning · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Computational finance and economics › platform economics
data marketplace |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › stackelberg game
pricing strategy |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
stackelberg game |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
stackelberg game · 3.0reputation-based prediction · 3.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service PlatformsabstractIn current Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) platforms, data marketplaces are the primary mechanism by which data owners deliver data products and services to users. However, data owners incur substantial costs to collect or produce data before selling it, exposing them to economic risks due to market price fluctuations. Options trading, used in traditional commodity markets, can alleviate sellers' financial burdens with forward contracts at fixed option prices and pre-paid option premiums. To our knowledge, the application of option trading in data marketplaces has not been thoroughly studied or implemented. In this work, we advocate for the first data options marketplace on a DaaS platform that mitigates price fluctuation risks and reduces market entry barriers. Designing such a marketplace involves several key challenges, including the easy replication of data and the difficulty in assessing data quality before production. To address these challenges, we first design a data quality prediction method based on sellers' reputation. Following this, we model and quantify the competitive relationships among buyers. On this basis, we model the interactions between sellers and buyers in the data options market as a two-stage Stackelberg game, focusing on maximizing sellers' profit. We formally derive the perfect subgame equilibrium for option trading and derive each seller's optimal pricing strategy. Numerical experiments demonstrate the superiority of data options trading over conventional data trading methods in DaaS platforms. Cheng Zhang 0035, Yang Xu 0013, Runyu Kang, Hangfan Li, Shihao Xiao, Peng Sun 0003 |
IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. | 6 |
| 2024 | Redactable Blockchain-Based Secure and Accountable Data ManagementabstractBlockchain provides trustworthy properties such as decentralization, traceability, and transparency, and has been applied in various fields. Given the complexity of guaranteeing the accuracy of the input data, erroneous data may be stored on the blockchain, making it hard to modify. As an effective solution, redactable blockchain allows on-chain data to be modified by introducing a chameleon hash function with a trapdoor, which enables on-chain erroneous data to be corrected. However, existing redactable blockchain solutions often require trusted third parties, have huge overhead, or lack effective accountability mechanisms to meet data security needs. Therefore, this paper proposes a secure, efficient and accountable data management scheme based on redactable blockchain. To cope with the possible frequent editing needs, we design an efficient and accountable distributed trapdoor recovery mechanism that reliably maintains data security while avoiding the security risks associated with centralized management. Various information during the trapdoor management process is also recorded on the chain as the basis for implementing accountability mechanisms. In addition, the one-time trapdoor technology allows the blockchain system to reduce the maintenance complexity of the system by eliminating the need to frequently update the system parameters when partial trapdoor information needs to be published. Theoretical and experimental results show that our scheme can achieve an efficient accountability mechanism while modifying the data on the chain at low cost. Yang Xu 0013, Shihao Xiao, Cheng Zhang 0035, Zhifei Ni, Guojun Wang 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manag. | 2 |