Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Mengzhe Yuan
dblp:362/6025
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · unresolved
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Empirical software engineering · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Show Me Your Code! Kill Code Poisoning: A Lightweight Method Based on Code Naturalness · ICSE 2025 |
Empirical software engineering › mining software repositories › source-code mining
code naturalness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Show Me Your Code! Kill Code Poisoning: A Lightweight Method Based on Code Naturalness · ICSE 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
n-gram language models · 0.9n-gram language model · 0.9code language models · 0.9code language model · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Show Me Your Code! Kill Code Poisoning: A Lightweight Method Based on Code NaturalnessabstractNeural code models (NCMs) have demonstrated extraordinary capabilities in code intelligence tasks. Meanwhile, the security of NCMs and NCMs-based systems has garnered increasing attention. In particular, NCMs are often trained on large-scale data from potentially untrustworthy sources, providing attackers with the opportunity to manipulate them by inserting crafted samples into the data. This type of attack is called a code poisoning attack (also known as a backdoor attack). It allows attackers to implant backdoors in NCMs and thus control model behavior, which poses a significant security threat. However, there is still a lack of effective techniques for detecting various complex code poisoning attacks. In this paper, we propose an innovative and lightweight technique for code poisoning detection named KillbadCode. KillbadCode is designed based on our insight that code poisoning disrupts the naturalness of code. Specifically, KillBADCODE first builds a code language model (CodeLM) on a lightweight$n$-gram language model. Then, given poisoned data, KillbadCode utilizes CodeLM to identify those tokens in (poisoned) code snippets that will make the code snippets more natural after being deleted as trigger tokens. Considering that the removal of some normal tokens in a single sample might also enhance code naturalness, leading to a high false positive rate (FPR), we aggregate the cumulative improvement of each token across all samples. Finally, KillbadCode purifies the poisoned data by removing all poisoned samples containing the identified trigger tokens. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of KillbadCode, involving two types of advanced code poisoning attacks (a total of five poisoning strategies) and datasets from four representative code intelligence tasks. The experimental results demonstrate that across 20 code poisoning detection scenarios, KillbadCode achieves an average FPR of 8.30 % and an average Recall of 100 %, significantly outperforming four baselines. More importantly, KillBadCode is very efficient, with a minimum time consumption of only 5 minutes, and is 25 times faster than the best baseline on average. Weisong Sun, Mengzhe Yuan, Chunrong Fang, Zhenpeng Chen 0001, Chong Wang 0013, Yang Liu 0003, Baowen Xu, Zhenyu Chen 0001 |
ICSE | 3 |