Finding dense subgraphs is a fundamental problem with applications to community detection, clustering, and data mining. Our work focuses on finding approximate densest subgraphs in directed graphs in computational models for processing massive data. We consider two such models: Massively Parallel Computation (MPC) and semi-streaming. We show how to find a $(2+\varepsilon)$-approximation in $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\log n})$ MPC rounds with sublinear memory per machine. This improves the state-of-the-art results by Bahmani et al. (WAW 2014) and Mitrovic \& Pan (ICML 2024). Moreover, we show how to find an $O(\log n)$-approximation in a single pass in semi-streaming. This is in stark contrast to prior work, which implies $\tilde{\Omega}(n^{1/6})$-approximation for a single pass; a better approximation is known only for randomized streams (Mitrovi\'c \& Pan). This is the first deterministic single-pass semi-streaming algorithm for the densest subgraph problem, both for undirected and directed graphs. Our semi-streaming approach is also an insertion-only dynamic algorithm, attaining the first directed densest subgraph algorithm with $O(\log^2 n)$ worst-case update time while using sub-linear memory. We empirically evaluate our approaches in two ways. First, we illustrate that our single-pass semi-streaming algorithm performs much better than the theoretical guarantee. Specifically, its approximation on temporal datasets matches the $(2+\varepsilon)$-approximation of an $O(\log n)$-pass algorithm by Bahmani et al. (VLDB 2012). Second, we demonstrate that our MPC algorithm requires fewer rounds than prior work.

Online voting is convenient and flexible, but amplifies the risks of voter coercion and vote buying. One promising mitigation strategy enables voters to give a coercer fake voting credentials, which silently cast votes that do not count. Current systems along these lines make problematic assumptions about credential issuance, however, such as strong trust in a registrar and/or in voter-controlled hardware, or expecting voters to interact with multiple registrars. Votegral is the first coercion-resistant voting architecture that leverages the physical security of in-person registration to address these credential-issuance challenges, amortizing the convenience costs of in-person registration by reusing credentials across successive elections. Votegral's registration component, TRIP, gives voters a kiosk in a privacy booth with which to print real and fake credentials on paper, eliminating dependence on trusted hardware in credential issuance. The voter learns and can verify in the privacy booth which credential is real, but real and fake credentials thereafter appear indistinguishable to others. Only voters actually under coercion, a hopefully-rare case, need to trust the kiosk. To achieve verifiability, each paper credential encodes an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is sound in real credentials but unsound in fake credentials. Voters observe the difference in the order of printing steps, but need not understand the technical details. Experimental results with our prototype suggest that Votegral is practical and sufficiently scalable for real-world elections. User-visible latency of credential issuance in TRIP is at most 19.7 seconds even on resource-constrained kiosk hardware, making it suitable for registration at remote locations or on battery power. A companion usability study indicates that TRIP's usability is competitive with other e-voting systems including some lacking coercion resistance, and formal proofs support TRIP's combination of coercion-resistance and verifiability.