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Frederick Shpilevskiy

dblp:365/8101 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Privacy and data protection · 70% Security and privacy of machine learning · 30%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Optimization for machine learning · 67% Trustworthy machine learning · 33%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › adaptive optimization
adam
0.812024
DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction) · AAAI 2024
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning
adaptive optimization
0.812024
DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction) · AAAI 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › certified robustness
certified adversarial robustness
0.812024
Adaptive Randomized Smoothing: Certified Adversarial Robustness for Multi-Step Defences · NeurIPS 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial example
0.812024
Adaptive Randomized Smoothing: Certified Adversarial Robustness for Multi-Step Defences · NeurIPS 2024
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
differentially private optimization
0.812024
DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction) · AAAI 2024
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
0.812024
DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction) · AAAI 2024
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › differentially private deep learning
DP-SGD
0.212024
DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction) · AAAI 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

second moment estimation · 1.5randomized smoothing · 1.5f-differential privacy · 1.5bias correction · 1.5adaptive composition · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 DP-AdamBC: Your DP-Adam Is Actually DP-SGD (Unless You Apply Bias Correction)
abstract
The Adam optimizer is a popular choice in contemporary deep learning due to its strong empirical performance. However we observe that in privacy sensitive scenarios, the traditional use of Differential Privacy (DP) with the Adam optimizer leads to sub-optimal performance on several tasks. We find that this performance degradation is due to a DP bias in Adam's second moment estimator, introduced by the addition of independent noise in the gradient computation to enforce DP guarantees. This DP bias leads to a different scaling for low variance parameter updates, that is inconsistent with the behavior of non-private Adam, and Adam's sign descent interpretation. We propose the DP-AdamBC optimization algorithm, which corrects for the bias in the second moment estimation and retrieves the expected behaviour of Adam. Empirically, DP-AdamBC significantly improves the optimization performance of DP-Adam by up to 3.5% in final accuracy in image, text, and graph node classification tasks.
Qiaoyue Tang, Frederick Shpilevskiy, Mathias Lécuyer
AAAI2
2024 Adaptive Randomized Smoothing: Certified Adversarial Robustness for Multi-Step Defences
abstract
We propose Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS) to certify the predictions of our test-time adaptive models against adversarial examples. ARS extends the analysis of randomized smoothing using $f$-Differential Privacy to certify the adaptive composition of multiple steps. For the first time, our theory covers the sound adaptive composition of general and high-dimensional functions of noisy inputs. We instantiate ARS on deep image classification to certify predictions against adversarial examples of bounded $L_{\infty}$ norm. In the $L_{\infty}$ threat model, ARS enables flexible adaptation through high-dimensional input-dependent masking. We design adaptivity benchmarks, based on CIFAR-10 and CelebA, and show that ARS improves standard test accuracy by 1 to 15\% points. On ImageNet, ARS improves certified test accuracy by up to 1.6% points over standard RS without adaptivity. Our code is available at [https://github.com/ubc-systopia/adaptive-randomized-smoothing](https://github.com/ubc-systopia/adaptive-randomized-smoothing).
Saiyue Lyu, Shadab Shaikh, Frederick Shpilevskiy, Evan Shelhamer, Mathias Lécuyer
NeurIPS3