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Hong Eun Ahn

dblp:365/9070 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference
1.012026
Amplifying Training Data Exposure Through Fine-Tuning With Pseudo-Labeled Memberships · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
training data extraction
1.012026
Amplifying Training Data Exposure Through Fine-Tuning With Pseudo-Labeled Memberships · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model
0.312026
Amplifying Training Data Exposure Through Fine-Tuning With Pseudo-Labeled Memberships · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

reinforcement learning from human feedback · 2.0pseudo-labeling · 2.0fine-tuning · 2.0DetectGPT · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Amplifying Training Data Exposure Through Fine-Tuning With Pseudo-Labeled Memberships
abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to training data extraction attacks due to data memorization. This paper introduces a novel attack scenario wherein an attacker adversarially fine-tunes pre-trained LLMs to amplify the exposure of the original training data. Unlike prior TDE methods that mainly rely on post-hoc querying or prompt selection to elicit memorized content from a fixed model, our strategy directly alters the model’s parameters to intensify its retention of the pre-training dataset. To achieve this, the attacker needs to collect generated texts that are closely aligned with the pre-training data. However, without knowledge of the actual dataset, quantifying the amount of pre-training data within generated texts is challenging. To address this, we propose the use of pseudo-labels for these generated texts, leveraging membership approximations indicated by machine-generated probabilities from the target LLMusing DetectGPT. We subsequently fine-tune the LLM via reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to favor generations with higher likelihoods of originating from the pre-training data, based on these membership probabilities. Our empirical findings indicate a remarkable outcome: LLMs with over 1B parameters exhibit a four to eight-fold increase in training data exposure. We discuss potential mitigations and suggest future research directions.
Myung Gyo Oh, Hong Eun Ahn, Leo Hyun Park, Taekyoung Kwon 0002
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.2