Kubernetes (K8s) has emerged as the de facto orchestrator of microservices, providing scalability and extensibility to a highly dynamic environment. It builds an intricate and deeply connected system that requires extensive monitoring capabilities to be properly managed. To this account, K8s natively offers audit logs, a powerful feature for tracking Application Programming Interface (API) interactions in the cluster. Audit logs provide a detailed and chronological record of all activities in the system. Unfortunately, K8s auditing suffers from several practical limitations: it generates large volumes of data continuously, as all components within the cluster interact and respond to user actions. Moreover, each action can trigger a cascade of secondary events dispersed across the log, with little to no explicit linkage, making it difficult to reconstruct the context behind user-initiated operations. In this paper, we introduce K8NTEXT, a novel approach for streamlining K8s audit logs by reconstructing contexts , i.e., grouping actions performed by actors on the cluster with the subsequent events these actions cause. Correlated API calls are automatically identified, labeled, and consistently grouped using a combination of inference rules and a Machine Learning (ML) model, largely simplifying data consumption. We evaluate K8NTEXT’s performance, scalability, and expressiveness both in systematic tests and with a series of use cases. We show that it consistently provides accurate context reconstruction, even for complex operations involving 50, 100 or more correlated actions, achieving over 95 % accuracy across the entire spectrum, from simple to highly composite actions.

Kubernetes (K8s) has grown in popularity over the past few years to become thede-factostandard for container orchestration in cloud-native environments. While research is not new to topics such as containerization and access control security, the Application Programming Interface (API) interactions between K8s and its runtime interfaces have not been studied thoroughly. In particular, the CRI-API is responsible for abstracting the container runtime, managing the creation and lifecycle of containers along with the downloads of the respective images. However, this decoupling of concerns and the abstraction of the container runtime renders K8s unaware of the status of the downloading process of the container images, obstructing the monitoring of the resources allocated to such process. In this paper, we discuss how this lack of status information can be exploited as a Denial of Service attack in a K8s cluster. We show how such attacks can impact worker nodes, generating up to 95% average CPU usage, prevent downloads of new container images, and increase I/O and network usage for a potentially unlimited amount of time.We argue that solving this problem would require a radical architectural change in the relationship between K8s and the CRI-API, which would be unfeasible in the short term. Thus, as a stopgap solution, we propose MAGI: an eBPF-based, proof-of-concept mitigation that detects and terminates potential attacks.