Federated learning (FL) is a popular collaborative learning paradigm, whereby agents with individual datasets can jointly train an ML model. While higher data sharing improves model accuracy and leads to higher payoffs, it also raises costs associated with data acquisition or loss of privacy, causing agents to be strategic about their data contribution. This leads to undesirable behavior at a Nash equilibrium (NE) such as *free-riding*, resulting in sub-optimal fairness, data sharing, and welfare. To address this, we design $\mathcal{M}^{Shap}$, a budget-balanced payment mechanism for FL, that admits Nash equilibria under mild conditions, and achieves *reciprocal fairness*: where each agent's payoff equals her contribution to the collaboration, as measured by the Shapley share. In addition to fairness, we show that the NE under $\mathcal{M}^{Shap}$ has desirable guarantees in terms of accuracy, welfare, and total data collected. We validate our theoretical results through experiments, demonstrating that $\mathcal{M}^{Shap}$ outperforms baselines in terms of fairness and efficiency.

We study fair division of indivisible goods under the maximin share (MMS) fairness criterion in settings where agents are grouped into a small number of types, with agents within each type having identical valuations. For the special case of a single type, an exact MMS allocation is always guaranteed to exist. However, for two or more distinct agent types, exact MMS allocations do not always exist, shifting the focus to establishing the existence of approximate-MMS allocations. A series of works over the last decade has resulted in the best-known approximation guarantee of 3/4 + 3/3836. In this paper, we improve the approximation guarantees for settings where agents are grouped into two or three types, a scenario that arises in many practical settings. Specifically, we present novel algorithms that guarantee a 4/5-MMS allocation for two agent types and a 16/21-MMS allocation for three agent types. Our approach leverages the MMS partition of the majority type and adapts it to provide improved fairness guarantees for all types.

The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of acquiring valuable data against the cost of sharing their own. Ensuring stability in these exchanges is essential to prevent agents—or groups of agents—from departing and conducting local (and potentially more favorable) exchanges among themselves. To address this, we study a model where $n$ agents participate in a data exchange. Each agent has an associated payoff for the data acquired from other agents and a cost incurred during sharing its own data. The net utility of an agent is payoff minus the cost. We adapt the classical notion of *core-stability* from cooperative game theory to data exchange. A data exchange is core-stable if no subset of agents has any incentive to deviate to a different exchange. We show that a core-stable data exchange is guaranteed to exist when agents have concave payoff functions and convex cost functions-- a setting typical in domains like PAC learning and random discovery models. We show that relaxing either of the foregoing conditions may result in the nonexistence of core-stable data exchanges. Then, we prove that finding a core-stable exchange is *PPAD-hard*, even when the potential blocking coalitions are restricted to constant size. To the best of our knowledge, this provides the first known PPAD-hardness result for core-like guarantees in data economics. Finally, we show that data exchange can be modelled as a *balanced* $n$-person game. This immediately gives a pivoting algorithm via Scarf's theorem [Scarf1967core]. We show that the pivoting algorithm works well in practice through our empirical results.

Contrastive learning is a powerful technique for discovering meaningful data representations by optimizing objectives based on $\textit{contrastive information}$, often given as a set of weighted triplets $\{(x_i, y_i^+, z_{i}^-)\}_{i = 1}^m$ indicating that an "anchor" $x_i$ is more similar to a "positive" example $y_i$ than to a "negative" example $z_i$. The goal is to find representations (e.g., embeddings in $\mathbb{R}^d$ or a tree metric) where anchors are placed closer to positive than to negative examples. While finding $\textit{global}$ optima of contrastive objectives is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard, the complexity of finding $\text{\textit{local}}$ optima---representations that do not improve by local search algorithms such as gradient-based methods---remains open. Our work settles the complexity of finding local optima in various contrastive learning problems by proving $\mathsf{PLS}$-hardness in discrete settings (e.g., maximize satisfied triplets) and $\mathsf{CLS}$-hardness in continuous settings (e.g., minimize Triplet Loss), where $\mathsf{PLS}$ (Polynomial Local Search) and $\mathsf{CLS}$ (Continuous Local Search) are well-studied complexity classes capturing local search dynamics in discrete and continuous optimization, respectively. Our results imply that no polynomial time algorithm (local search or otherwise) can find a local optimum for various contrastive learning problems, unless $\mathsf{PLS}\subseteq\mathsf{P}$ (or $\mathsf{CLS}\subseteq \mathsf{P}$ for continuous problems). Even in the unlikely scenario that $\mathsf{PLS}\subseteq\mathsf{P}$ (or $\mathsf{CLS}\subseteq \mathsf{P}$), our reductions imply that there exist instances where local search algorithms need exponential time to reach a local optimum, even for $d=1$ (embeddings on a line).

We investigate the problem of fairly allocating m indivisible items among n sequentially arriving agents with additive valuations, under the sought-after fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). We first observe a strong impossibility: without appropriate knowledge about the valuation functions of the incoming agents, no online algorithm can ensure any non-trivial MMS approximation, even when there are only two agents.