The Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) integrates vehicles to the enormous realm of cyberspace which introduces some intelligence and convenience in the transportation sector. However, real-time traffic related information is exchanged over the open public internet among the vehicles and with other infrastructures. This exposes these networks to a myriad of security threats that can lead to accidents and congestions. Although many solutions have been developed over the recent past, most of them are inefficient while others are still susceptible to attacks. In this paper, we leverage on the k-valued modified bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman problem and one-way hashing function to develop an efficient authentication protocol for IoVs. To demonstrate the robustness of its semantic security, we deploy the Real or Random (ROR) model. In addition, we execute extensive informal security anaysis to show that our scheme resists typical IoVs attacks such as forgery, privileged insider, and replay. Moreover, its performance evaluation shows that it incurs the lowest computation and communication overheads among its peers. Specifically, the proposed protocol reduces the transmission overheads by 8.5%, while increasing the supported security functionalities by 88.9%. It is therefor suitable for deployment in the IoV environment to mitigate the numerous security threats at relatively lower computation and energy costs.

The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) holds the promise of cutting costs and improving both efficiency and quality of healthcare systems. In IoMT, billions of sensitive patient physiological data are exchanged among the patients and healthcare facilities. Since open channels are used during these exchanges, attackers can compromise this data, posing serious consequences which can be fatal. Although a myriad of techniques have been developed to mitigate these threats, they are either inefficient or lack some pertinent security features. In this paper, we leverage on lightweight cryptographic primitives to develop an authentication protocol that is not only efficient but also robust against typical IoMT threats. The performance evaluation carried out shows that our approach reduced the computation complexity by 58.26% while thwarting threats such as session key disclosure, privileged insider, offline guessing, replay, side-channeling and session hijacking. In addition, the formal security analysis using Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic demonstrates the robustness of the mutual authentication procedures.