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Abdellah El Mrini

dblp:368/8547 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Efficient and distributed learning · 70% Optimization for machine learning · 23% Learning theory · 7%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Privacy and data protection · 50%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › distributed training
decentralized learning
0.812024
Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › distributed optimization
distributed gradient descent
0.812024
Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning
0.812024
Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
personalized federated learning
0.812024
Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
data reconstruction
0.812024
Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
privacy attack
0.812024
Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024
Machine learning › Learning theory
generalization bounds
0.212024
Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

reconstruction attack · 1.5gossip averaging · 1.5interpolation · 0.8fine-tuning · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning
abstract
Decentralized Gradient Descent (D-GD) allows a set of users to perform collaborative learning without sharing their data by iteratively averaging local model updates with their neighbors in a network graph. The absence of direct communication between non-neighbor nodes might lead to the belief that users cannot infer precise information about the data of others. In this work, we demonstrate the opposite, by proposing the first attack against D-GD that enables a user (or set of users) to reconstruct the private data of other users outside their immediate neighborhood. Our approach is based on a reconstruction attack against the gossip averaging protocol, which we then extend to handle the additional challenges raised by D-GD. We validate the effectiveness of our attack on real graphs and datasets, showing that the number of users compromised by a single or a handful of attackers is often surprisingly large. We empirically investigate some of the factors that affect the performance of the attack, namely the graph topology, the number of attackers, and their position in the graph.
Abdellah El Mrini, Edwige Cyffers, Aurélien Bellet
ICML1
2024 Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients
abstract
Federated learning (FL) is an appealing paradigm that allows a group of machines (a.k.a. clients) to learn collectively while keeping their data local. However, due to the heterogeneity between the clients’ data distributions, the model obtained through the use of FL algorithms may perform poorly on some client’s data. Personalization addresses this issue by enabling each client to have a different model tailored to their own data while simultaneously benefiting from the other clients’ data. We consider an FL setting where some clients can be adversarial, and we derive conditions under which full collaboration fails. Specifically, we analyze the generalization performance of an interpolated personalized FL framework in the presence of adversarial clients, and we precisely characterize situations when full collaboration performs strictly worse than fine-tuned personalization. Our analysis determines how much we should scale down the level of collaboration, according to data heterogeneity and the tolerable fraction of adversarial clients. We support our findings with empirical results on mean estimation and binary classification problems, considering synthetic and benchmark image classification datasets
Youssef Allouah, Abdellah El Mrini, Rachid Guerraoui, Nirupam Gupta, Rafael Pinot
NeurIPS2