Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Abdellah El Mrini
dblp:368/8547
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Efficient and distributed learning · 70% Optimization for machine learning · 23% Learning theory · 7% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Privacy and data protection · 50% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › distributed training
decentralized learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › distributed optimization
distributed gradient descent |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
personalized federated learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024 |
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
data reconstruction |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
privacy attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Privacy Attacks in Decentralized Learning · ICML 2024 |
Machine learning › Learning theory
generalization bounds |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial Clients · NeurIPS 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
reconstruction attack · 1.5gossip averaging · 1.5interpolation · 0.8fine-tuning · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Privacy Attacks in Decentralized LearningabstractDecentralized Gradient Descent (D-GD) allows a set of users to perform collaborative learning without sharing their data by iteratively averaging local model updates with their neighbors in a network graph. The absence of direct communication between non-neighbor nodes might lead to the belief that users cannot infer precise information about the data of others. In this work, we demonstrate the opposite, by proposing the first attack against D-GD that enables a user (or set of users) to reconstruct the private data of other users outside their immediate neighborhood. Our approach is based on a reconstruction attack against the gossip averaging protocol, which we then extend to handle the additional challenges raised by D-GD. We validate the effectiveness of our attack on real graphs and datasets, showing that the number of users compromised by a single or a handful of attackers is often surprisingly large. We empirically investigate some of the factors that affect the performance of the attack, namely the graph topology, the number of attackers, and their position in the graph. Abdellah El Mrini, Edwige Cyffers, Aurélien Bellet |
ICML | 1 |
| 2024 | Fine-Tuning Personalization in Federated Learning to Mitigate Adversarial ClientsabstractFederated learning (FL) is an appealing paradigm that allows a group of machines
(a.k.a. clients) to learn collectively while keeping their data local. However, due
to the heterogeneity between the clients’ data distributions, the model obtained
through the use of FL algorithms may perform poorly on some client’s data.
Personalization addresses this issue by enabling each client to have a different
model tailored to their own data while simultaneously benefiting from the other
clients’ data. We consider an FL setting where some clients can be adversarial, and
we derive conditions under which full collaboration fails. Specifically, we analyze
the generalization performance of an interpolated personalized FL framework in the
presence of adversarial clients, and we precisely characterize situations when full
collaboration performs strictly worse than fine-tuned personalization. Our analysis
determines how much we should scale down the level of collaboration, according
to data heterogeneity and the tolerable fraction of adversarial clients. We support
our findings with empirical results on mean estimation and binary classification
problems, considering synthetic and benchmark image classification datasets Youssef Allouah, Abdellah El Mrini, Rachid Guerraoui, Nirupam Gupta, Rafael Pinot |
NeurIPS | 2 |