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Yanghao Su

dblp:371/4311 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0007-0339-8551ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › model behavior analysis
decision boundary analysis
0.812024
Model X-ray: Detecting Backdoored Models via Decision Boundary · ACM Multimedia 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
model security
0.812024
Model X-ray: Detecting Backdoored Models via Decision Boundary · ACM Multimedia 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection
0.812024
Model X-ray: Detecting Backdoored Models via Decision Boundary · ACM Multimedia 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

decision boundary analysis · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Model X-ray: Detecting Backdoored Models via Decision Boundary
abstract
Backdoor attacks pose a significant security vulnerability for deep neural networks (DNNs), enabling them to operate normally on clean inputs but manipulate predictions when specific trigger patterns occur. In this paper, we consider a practical post-training scenario backdoor defense, where the defender aims to evaluate whether a trained model has been compromised by backdoor attacks. Currently, post-training backdoor detection approaches often operate under the assumption that the defender has knowledge of the attack information, logit output from the model, and knowledge of the model parameters, limiting their implementation in practical scenarios.
Yanghao Su, Jie Zhang 0073, Ting Xu 0004, Tianwei Zhang 0004, Weiming Zhang 0001, Nenghai Yu
ACM Multimedia1