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Jeffrey G. Wang

dblp:371/4465 · also Jeffrey George Wang · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-5707-5113ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference
0.712023
MoPe: Model Perturbation based Privacy Attacks on Language Models · EMNLP 2023
Security and privacy of machine learning › model privacy
memorization
0.712023
MoPe: Model Perturbation based Privacy Attacks on Language Models · EMNLP 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

model perturbation · 0.7hessian trace approximation · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 MoPe: Model Perturbation based Privacy Attacks on Language Models
abstract
Recent work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can unintentionally leak sensitive information present in their training data.In this paper, we present MoPe θ (Model Perturbations), a new method to identify with high confidence if a given text is in the training data of a pre-trained language model, given white-box access to the models parameters.MoPe θ adds noise to the model in parameter space and measures the drop in log-likelihood at a given point x, a statistic we show approximates the trace of the Hessian matrix with respect to model parameters.Across language models ranging from 70M to 12B parameters, we show that MoPe θ is more effective than existing loss-based attacks and recently proposed perturbation-based methods.We also examine the role of training point order and model size in attack success, and empirically demonstrate that MoPe θ accurately approximate the trace of the Hessian in practice.Our results show that the loss of a point alone is insufficient to determine extractability-there are training points we can recover using our method that have average loss.This casts some doubt on prior works that use the loss of a point as evidence of memorization or "unlearning."
Marvin Li, Jeffrey G. Wang, Seth Neel
EMNLP3