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Matthew vonAllmen

dblp:371/4929 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0003-4753-5504ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Approximation and online algorithms · 44% Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 44% Information theory · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
prophet inequality
0.812024
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design · EC 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
transaction fee mechanism design
0.812024
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design · EC 2024
Information theory › probability theory › measure concentration
concentration inequalities
0.212024
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design · EC 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

probability bounds · 0.8concentration inequalities · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design
abstract
This paper studies the fundamental limits of availability and throughput for independent and heterogeneous demands of a limited resource. Availability is the probability that the demands are below the capacity of the resource. Throughput is the expected fraction of the resource that is utilized by the demands. We offer a concentration inequality generator that gives lower bounds on feasible availability and throughput pairs with a given capacity and independent but not necessarily identical distributions of up-to-unit demands. We show that availability and throughput cannot both be poor. These bounds are analogous to tail inequalities on sums of independent random variables, but hold throughout the support of the demand distribution. This analysis gives analytically tractable bounds supporting the unit-demand characterization of Chawla et al. [2023] and generalizes to up-to-unit demands. Our bounds also provide an approach towards improved multi-unit prophet inequalities [Hajiaghayi et al., 2007]. They have applications to transaction fee mechanism design (for blockchains) where high availability limits the probability of profitable user-miner coalitions [Chung and Shi, 2023].
Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R. Sinha, Matthew vonAllmen
EC4