Mirror neurons are a class of neurons that activate both when an individual observes an action and when they perform the same action. This mechanism reveals a fundamental interplay between action understanding and embodied execution, suggesting that these two abilities are inherently connected. Nonetheless, existing machine learning methods largely overlook this interplay, treating these abilities as separate tasks. In this study, we provide a unified perspective in modeling them through the lens of representation learning. We first observe that their intermediate representations spontaneously align. Inspired by mirror neurons, we further introduce an approach that explicitly aligns the representations of observed and executed actions. Specifically, we employ two linear layers to map the representations to a shared latent space, where contrastive learning enforces the alignment of corresponding representations, effectively maximizing their mutual information. Experiments demonstrate that this simple approach fosters mutual synergy between the two tasks, effectively improving representation quality and generalization.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's minds based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to ToM reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use handcrafted, rigid agent models for model-based inference, which are more robust but fail to generalize across domains. In this work, we introduce *AutoToM*, an automated agent modeling method for scalable, robust, and interpretable mental inference. Given a ToM problem, *AutoToM* first proposes an initial agent model and then performs automated Bayesian inverse planning based on this model, leveraging an LLM backend. Guided by inference uncertainty, it iteratively refines the model by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Across five diverse benchmarks, *AutoToM* outperforms existing ToM methods and even large reasoning models. Additionally, we show that *AutoToM* can produce human‐like confidence estimates and enable online mental inference for embodied decision-making.

Understanding and attributing mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), emerges as a fundamental capability for human social reasoning. While Large Language Models (LLMs) appear to possess certain ToM abilities, the mechanisms underlying these capabilities remain elusive. In this study, we discover that it is possible to linearly decode the belief status from the perspectives of various agents through neural activations of language models, indicating the existence of internal representations of self and others’ beliefs. By manipulating these representations, we observe dramatic changes in the models’ ToM performance, underscoring their pivotal role in the social reasoning process. Additionally, our findings extend to diverse social reasoning tasks that involve different causal inference patterns, suggesting the potential generalizability of these representations.