Direct-to-cell satellites enable global network services for our regular phones/IoTs via 4G, 5G, and beyond. To enforce highly available, trustworthy, and roaming policy-compliant network services, they heavily rely on user geolocation and timing information from external global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) to assist with their radio access, authentication, and authorization. Our analysis and field tests reveal that, this cross-technology over-reliance propagates satellite navigation's defects to direct-to-cell satellite networks, leading to diverse issues such as intermittent connectivity, over/under-billing, unauthorized services, and service denials even when direct-to-cell satellites are accessible. Our solution, SN2, adopts the "fate-sharing" principle to reuse direct-to-cell satellites themselves for self-navigating networks. By exploiting the flexible tradeoffs between satellite network availability and navigation accuracy, it enables "good enough" built-in navigation for highly available and functionally correct network services at a negligible cost of hardware or communication resources. Our evaluations with commodity satellite phones and 3GPP NTN protocol stacks demonstrate SN2's 4.4–23.5× network availability boost and 1.9–12.3× access latency reduction over legacy solutions.

The emergent direct-to-cell Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite mega-constellations promise ubiquitous LTE/5G access for our commodity phones and IoTs without terrestrial base stations. While their extreme scale and mobility help tolerate diverse attacks, we show that both new features are exploitable to amplify signaling protocol vulnerabilities inherited from LTE/5G and obfuscate attacks to threaten satellite services. We showcase this with SatOver, a control-plane cross-layer attack that lets a greedy terrestrial operator or a man-in-the-middle attacker block all direct-to-cell satellites in urban areas. SatOver can reuse terrestrial LTE/5G base stations or deploy commodity software-defined radios as false satellites, stealthily hijack victim devices, delay their satellite access, stop them from probing other satellites, and block the entire mega-constellation. Our real-world satellite tests, lab tests with commodity 3GPP NR/IoT-NTN stacks, and operational trace-driven emulation validate SatOver’s viability for attacking COTS and upcoming NTN phones/IoTs. We discuss potential defenses against SatOver’s attack amplification/obfuscation.