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Keltin Grimes

dblp:374/9630 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editing · ICLR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › model security
model editing attack
0.912025
Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editing · ICLR 2025
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model
0.312025
Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editing · ICLR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

model editing · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editing
abstract
Model editing methods modify specific behaviors of Large Language Models by altering a small, targeted set of network weights and require very little data and compute. These methods can be used for malicious applications such as inserting misinformation or simple trojans that result in adversary-specified behaviors when a trigger word is present. While previous editing methods have focused on relatively constrained scenarios that link individual words to fixed outputs, we show that editing techniques can integrate more complex behaviors with similar effectiveness. We develop Concept-ROT, a model editing-based method that efficiently inserts trojans which not only exhibit complex output behaviors, but also trigger on high-level concepts -- presenting an entirely new class of trojan attacks. Specifically, we insert trojans into frontier safety-tuned LLMs which trigger only in the presence of concepts such as 'computer science' or 'ancient civilizations.' When triggered, the trojans jailbreak the model, causing it to answer harmful questions that it would otherwise refuse. Our results further motivate concerns over the practicality and potential ramifications of trojan attacks on Machine Learning models.
Keltin Grimes, Marco Christiani, David Shriver, Marissa Connor
ICLR1