Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Pengrun Huang
dblp:378/2833
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Privacy and data protection · 50% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Language models and text generation · 100% |
Topics — the 1 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
property inference attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Can We Infer Confidential Properties of Training Data from LLMs? · NeurIPS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
word frequency signals · 1.7shadow-model attack · 1.7prompt-based generation attack · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Can We Infer Confidential Properties of Training Data from LLMs?abstractLarge language models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned on domain-specific datasets to support applications in fields such as healthcare, finance, and law. These fine-tuning datasets often have sensitive and confidential dataset-level properties — such as patient demographics or disease prevalence—that are not intended to be revealed. While prior work has studied property inference attacks on discriminative models (e.g., image classification models) and generative models (e.g., GANs for image data), it remains unclear if such attacks transfer to LLMs. In this work, we introduce PropInfer, a benchmark task for evaluating property inference in LLMs under two fine-tuning paradigms: question-answering and chat-completion. Built on the ChatDoctor dataset, our benchmark includes a range of property types and task configurations. We further propose two tailored attacks: a prompt-based generation attack and a shadow-model attack leveraging word frequency signals. Empirical evaluations across multiple pretrained LLMs show the success of our attacks, revealing a previously unrecognized vulnerability in LLMs. Pengrun Huang, Chhavi Yadav, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Ruihan Wu |
NeurIPS | 1 |