Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Pengrun Huang

dblp:378/2833 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Privacy and data protection · 50%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 100%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
property inference attack
0.912025
Can We Infer Confidential Properties of Training Data from LLMs? · NeurIPS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

word frequency signals · 1.7shadow-model attack · 1.7prompt-based generation attack · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Can We Infer Confidential Properties of Training Data from LLMs?
abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned on domain-specific datasets to support applications in fields such as healthcare, finance, and law. These fine-tuning datasets often have sensitive and confidential dataset-level properties — such as patient demographics or disease prevalence—that are not intended to be revealed. While prior work has studied property inference attacks on discriminative models (e.g., image classification models) and generative models (e.g., GANs for image data), it remains unclear if such attacks transfer to LLMs. In this work, we introduce PropInfer, a benchmark task for evaluating property inference in LLMs under two fine-tuning paradigms: question-answering and chat-completion. Built on the ChatDoctor dataset, our benchmark includes a range of property types and task configurations. We further propose two tailored attacks: a prompt-based generation attack and a shadow-model attack leveraging word frequency signals. Empirical evaluations across multiple pretrained LLMs show the success of our attacks, revealing a previously unrecognized vulnerability in LLMs.
Pengrun Huang, Chhavi Yadav, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Ruihan Wu
NeurIPS1