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Martin Mulazzani

dblp:38/8102 · DBLP profile ↗
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19ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 15 · 3 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Web and mobile security · 53% Network security · 24% Systems and software security · 17%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
messaging application security
0.112012
Guess Who's Texting You? Evaluating the Security of Smartphone Messaging Applications · NDSS 2012
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.112012
Guess Who's Texting You? Evaluating the Security of Smartphone Messaging Applications · NDSS 2012
Cloud and datacenter computing
cloud storage
0.112011
Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Using Cloud Storage as Attack Vector and Online Slack Space · USENIX Security Symposium 2011
Web and mobile security
online social network security
0.112010
Exploiting social networking sites for spam · CCS 2010
Network security
spam
0.112010
Exploiting social networking sites for spam · CCS 2010
Network security
traffic analysis
0.012011
Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Using Cloud Storage as Attack Vector and Online Slack Space · USENIX Security Symposium 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

measurement study · 0.2protocol analysis · 0.1simulation · 0.1mathematical modeling · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 Trust me, I'm a Root CA! Analyzing SSL Root CAs in Modern Browsers and Operating Systems
abstract
The security and privacy of our online communications heavily relies on the entity authentication mechanisms provided by SSL. Those mechanisms in turn heavily depend on the trustworthiness of a large number of companies and governmental institutions for attestation of the identity of SSL services providers. In order to offer a wide and unobstructed availability of SSL-enabled services and to remove the need to make a large amount of trust decisions from their users, operating systems and browser manufactures include lists of certification authorities which are trusted for SSL entity authentication by their products. This has the problematic effect that users of such browsers and operating systems implicitly trust those certification authorities with the privacy of their communications while they might not even realize it. The problem is further complicated by the fact that different software vendors trust different companies and governmental institutions, from a variety of countries, which leads to an obscure distribution of trust. To give insight into the trust model used by SSL this thesis explains the various entities and technical processes involved in establishing trust when using SSL communications. It furthermore analyzes the number and origin of companies and governmental institutions trusted by various operating systems and browser vendors and correlates the gathered information to a variety of indexes to illustrate that some of these trusted entities are far from trustworthy. Furthermore it points out the fact that the number of entities we trust with the security of our SSL communications keeps growing over time and displays the negative effects this might have as well as shows that the trust model of SSL is fundamentally broken.
Tariq Fadai, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Peter Kieseberg, Martin Mulazzani
ARES4
2015 Gradually Improving the Forensic Process
abstract
At the time of writing, one of the most pressing problems for forensic investigators is the huge amount of data to analyze per case. Not only the number of devices increases due to the advancing computerization of every days life, but also the storage capacity of each and every device raises into multi-terabyte storage requirements per case for forensic working images. In this paper we improve the standardized forensic process by proposing to use file deduplication across devices as well as file white listing rigorously in investigations, to reduce the amount of data that needs to be stored for analysis as early as during data acquisition. These improvements happen in an automatic fashion and completely transparent to the forensic investigator. They furthermore be added without negative effects to the chain of custody or artefact validity in court, and are evaluated in a realistic use case.
Sebastian Neuner, Martin Mulazzani, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Edgar R. Weippl
ARES2
2014 IMSI-catch me if you can: IMSI-catcher-catchers
abstract
IMSI Catchers are used in mobile networks to identify and eavesdrop on phones. When, the number of vendors increased and prices dropped, the device became available to much larger audiences. Self-made devices based on open source software are available for about US$ 1,500.
Adrian Dabrowski, Nicola Pianta, Thomas Klepp, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl
ACSAC4
2014 Towards Fully Automated Digital Alibis with Social Interaction
Stefanie Beyer, Martin Mulazzani, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
IFIP Int. Conf. Digital Forensics2
2014 Spoiled Onions: Exposing Malicious Tor Exit Relays
Philipp Winter, Richard Köwer, Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber 0001, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Stefan Lindskog, Edgar R. Weippl
Privacy Enhancing Technologies3
2014 Covert Computation - Hiding code in code through compile-time obfuscation
Sebastian Schrittwieser, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001, Peter Kieseberg, Markus Huber 0001, Manuel Leithner, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl
Comput. Secur.6
2013 SHPF: Enhancing HTTP(S) Session Security with Browser Fingerprinting
abstract
Session hijacking has become a major problem in today's Web services, especially with the availability of free off-the-shelf tools. As major websites like Facebook, You tube and Yahoo still do not use HTTPS for all users by default, new methods are needed to protect the users' sessions if session tokens are transmitted in the clear. In this paper we propose the use of browser fingerprinting for enhancing current state-of-the-art HTTP(S) session management. Monitoring a wide set of features of the user's current browser makes session hijacking detectable at the server and raises the bar for attackers considerably. This paper furthermore identifies HTML5 and CSS features that can be used for browser fingerprinting and to identify or verify a browser without the need to rely on the User Agent string. We implemented our approach in a framework that is highly configurable and can be added to existing Web applications and server-side session management with ease.
Thomas Unger, Martin Mulazzani, Dominik Fruhwirt, Markus Huber 0001, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Edgar R. Weippl
ARES2
2013 Covert computation: hiding code in code for obfuscation purposes
abstract
As malicious software gets increasingly sophisticated and resilient to detection, new concepts for the identification of malicious behavior are developed by academia and industry alike. While today's malware detectors primarily focus on syntactical analysis (i.e., signatures of malware samples), the concept of semantic-aware malware detection has recently been proposed. Here, the classification is based on models that represent the underlying machine and map the effects of instructions on the hardware. In this paper, we demonstrate the incompleteness of these models and highlight the threat of malware, which exploits the gap between model and machine to stay undetectable. To this end, we introduce a novel concept we call covert computation, which implements functionality in side effects of microprocessors. For instance, the flags register can be used to calculate basic arithmetical and logical operations. Our paper shows how this technique could be used by malware authors to hide malicious code in a harmless-looking program. Furthermore, we demonstrate the resilience of covert computation against semantic-aware malware scanners.
Sebastian Schrittwieser, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001, Peter Kieseberg, Markus Huber 0001, Manuel Leithner, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl
AsiaCCS6
2013 Quantifying Windows File Slack Size and Stability
Martin Mulazzani, Sebastian Neuner, Peter Kieseberg, Markus Huber 0001, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Edgar R. Weippl
IFIP Int. Conf. Digital Forensics1
2012 Data Visualization for Social Network Forensics
Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
IFIP Int. Conf. Digital Forensics1
2012 Guess Who's Texting You? Evaluating the Security of Smartphone Messaging Applications
Sebastian Schrittwieser, Peter Frühwirt, Peter Kieseberg, Manuel Leithner, Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
NDSS5
2011 Social snapshots: digital forensics for online social networks
abstract
Recently, academia and law enforcement alike have shown a strong demand for data that is collected from online social networks. In this work, we present a novel method for harvesting such data from social networking websites. Our approach uses a hybrid system that is based on a custom add-on for social networks in combination with a web crawling component. The datasets that our tool collects contain profile information (user data, private messages, photos, etc.) and associated meta-data (internal timestamps and unique identifiers). These social snapshots are significant for security research and in the field of digital forensics. We implemented a prototype for Facebook and evaluated our system on a number of human volunteers. We show the feasibility and efficiency of our approach and its advantages in contrast to traditional techniques that rely on application-specific web crawling and parsing. Furthermore, we investigate different use-cases of our tool that include consensual application and the use of sniffed authentication cookies. Finally, we contribute to the research community by publishing our implementation as an open-source project.
Markus Huber 0001, Martin Mulazzani, Manuel Leithner, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Gilbert Wondracek, Edgar R. Weippl
ACSAC2
2011 Using the structure of B+-trees for enhancing logging mechanisms of databases
abstract
Today's database management systems implement sophisticated access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access and modifications. This is, as an example, an important basic requirement for SOX (Sarbanes--Oxley Act) compliance, whereby every past transaction has to be traceable at any time. However, malicious database administrators may still be able to bypass the security mechanisms to make hidden modifications to the database.
Peter Kieseberg, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Lorcan Morgan, Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
iiWAS4
2011 Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Using Cloud Storage as Attack Vector and Online Slack Space
Martin Mulazzani, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Manuel Leithner, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
USENIX Security Symposium1
2010 InnoDB Database Forensics
abstract
Whenever data is being processed, there are many places where parts of the data are temporarily stored; thus forensic analysis can reveal past activities, create a (partial) timeline and recover deleted data. While this fact is well known for computer forensics, multiple forensic tools exist to analyze data and the systematic analysis of database systems has only recently begun. This paper will describe the file format of the MySQL Database 5.1.32 with InnoDB Storage Engine. It will further explain with a practical example of how to reconstruct the data found in the file system of any SQL table. We will show how to reconstruct the table as it is, read data sets from the file and how to interpret the gained information.
Peter Frühwirt, Markus Huber 0001, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl
AINA3
2010 Exploiting social networking sites for spam
abstract
In the ongoing arms race between spammers and the multi-million dollar anti-spam industry, the number of unsolicited e-mail messages (better known as "spam") and phishing has increased heavily in the last decade. In this paper, we show that our novel friend-in-the-middle attack on social networking sites (SNSs) can be used to harvest social data in an automated fashion. This social data can then be exploited for large-scale attacks such as context-aware spam and social-phishing. We prove the feasibility of our attack exemplarily on Facebook and identify possible consequences based on a mathematical model and simulations. Alarmingly, all major SNSs are vulnerable to our attack as they fail to secure the network layer appropriately.
Markus Huber 0001, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl, Gerhard Kitzler, Sigrun Roat
CCS2
2010 QR code security
abstract
This paper examines QR Codes and how they can be used to attack both human interaction and automated systems. As the encoded information is intended to be machine readable only, a human cannot distinguish between a valid and a maliciously manipulated QR code. While humans might fall for phishing attacks, automated readers are most likely vulnerable to SQL injections and command injections. Our contribution consists of an analysis of the QR Code as an attack vector, showing different attack strategies from the attackers point of view and exploring their possible consequences.
Peter Kieseberg, Manuel Leithner, Martin Mulazzani, Lindsay Munroe, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Mayank Sinha, Edgar R. Weippl
MoMM3
2010 Who on Earth Is "Mr. Cypher": Automated Friend Injection Attacks on Social Networking Sites
Markus Huber 0001, Martin Mulazzani, Edgar R. Weippl
SEC2
2010 Anonymity and Monitoring: How to Monitor the Infrastructure of an Anonymity System
abstract
The Tor network is a widely deployed anonymity system on the Internet used by thousands of users every day. A basic monitoring system has been designed and implemented to allow long-term statistics, provide feedback to the interested user, and detect certain attacks on the network. The implementation has been added to TorStatus, a project to display the current state of the Tor network. During a period of six months, this monitoring system collected data, where information and patterns have been extracted and analyzed. Interestingly, the Tor network is very stable with more than half of all the servers located in Germany and the United States. The data also shows a sinusoidal pattern every 24 h in the total number of servers.
Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber 0001, Edgar R. Weippl
IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part C1