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Juergen Rahmel

dblp:380/4622 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0007-5080-8736ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 30% Privacy and data protection · 23% Systems and software security · 23%
Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 62% Language models and text generation · 38%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
fairness
1.012026
Reeq: Testing and Mitigating Ethically Inconsistent Suggestions of Large Language Models with Reflective Equilibrium · ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol. 2026
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model
0.912025
SelfDefend: LLMs Can Defend Themselves against Jailbreaking in a Practical Manner · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.912025
Testing and Understanding Deviation Behaviors in FHE-Hardened Machine Learning Models · ICSE 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
homomorphic encryption
0.912025
The Phantom Menace in Crypto-Based PET-Hardened Deep Learning Models: Invisible Configuration-Induced Attacks · CCS 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
0.912025
SelfDefend: LLMs Can Defend Themselves against Jailbreaking in a Practical Manner · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving machine learning
0.912025
The Phantom Menace in Crypto-Based PET-Hardened Deep Learning Models: Invisible Configuration-Induced Attacks · CCS 2025
Software testing
differential testing
0.912025
Testing and Understanding Deviation Behaviors in FHE-Hardened Machine Learning Models · ICSE 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
fully homomorphic encryption
0.312025
Testing and Understanding Deviation Behaviors in FHE-Hardened Machine Learning Models · ICSE 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

targeted testing · 2.6margin metric · 2.6differential testing · 2.6self-defense · 1.7prompting · 1.7test oracle · 1.0reflective equilibrium · 1.0fixed-point iteration · 1.0zero-knowledge proofs · 0.9secure multiparty computation · 0.9homomorphic encryption · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Reeq: Testing and Mitigating Ethically Inconsistent Suggestions of Large Language Models with Reflective Equilibrium
abstract
LLMs increasingly serve as general-purpose AI assistants in daily life, and their subtly unethical suggestions become a serious and real concern. It is demanding to test and mitigate such unethical suggestions from LLMs. Despite existing efforts to detect violations of “testable” facets of ethics (e.g., fairness testing), it is challenging to encode the full scope of ethics (e.g., justice, deontology) into a test oracle without human annotations or intervention. In this article, we take inspiration from reflective equilibrium, a modern moral reasoning method in moral and political philosophy, to guide our approach. Instead of seeking unethical suggestions in LLMs, we aim to identify behavioral inconsistency in LLMs’ ethics-related suggestions. These inconsistencies are anticipated to serve as a useful proxy and hint at unethical suggestions. We formulate reflective equilibrium in the form of fixed-point iteration, instantiate it as a novel test oracle, and also employ it to form a mitigation scheme for LLMs’ behavioral inconsistency on ethics-related inputs. To facilitate testing, we also create a comprehensive test suite, EthicsSuite , with 20K moral situations. In our study, we evaluate eight widely used LLMs. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are prone to ethical inconsistencies, with 81.22% of our test cases prompting ethically inconsistent suggestions on average. Our human evaluation suggests that the majority of these inconsistencies indeed manifest unethical biases. Our mitigation scheme effectively refines a significant number (80.1%) of these suggestions for commercial LLMs such as GPT-4 and Claude.
Pingchuan Ma 0004, Zhaoyu Wang 0006, Zongjie Li, Zhenlan Ji, Juergen Rahmel, Shuai Wang 0011
ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.6
2025 The Phantom Menace in Crypto-Based PET-Hardened Deep Learning Models: Invisible Configuration-Induced Attacks
abstract
The increasing use of deep learning (DL) models has given rise to significant privacy concerns regarding training and inference data. To address these concerns, the community has increasingly adopted crypto-based privacy-enhancing technologies (CPET) like homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multi-party computation (MPC), and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). The integration of CPET with DL, often referred to as CPET-DL, is commonly facilitated by specialized frameworks like CrypTen, TenSEAL, and EZKL. These frameworks offer configurable parameters to balance model accuracy and computational efficiency during privacy-preserving operations. However, these configurations, while seemingly harmless, can introduce subtle vulnerabilities. The stealthy attacks induced by misconfigurations are hard to detect because 1) the plaintext models remain vulnerability-free, and 2) existing auditing tools are hardly applicable to CPET-hardened models. This creates a paradox: tools intended to protect privacy can be undermined through configuration manipulation.
Yiteng Peng, Dongwei Xiao, Zhibo Liu 0001, Zhenlan Ji, Daoyuan Wu, Shuai Wang 0011, Juergen Rahmel
CCS7
2025 Testing and Understanding Deviation Behaviors in FHE-Hardened Machine Learning Models
abstract
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a promising cryptographic primitive that enables secure computation over encrypted data. A primary use of FHE is to support privacypreserving machine learning (ML) on public cloud infrastructures. Despite the rapid development of FHE-based ML (or HE-ML), the community lacks a systematic understanding of their robustness. In this paper, we aim to systematically test and understand the deviation behaviors of HE-ML models, where the same input causes deviant outputs between FHE-hardened models and their plaintext versions, leading to completely incorrect model predictions. To effectively uncover deviation-triggering inputs under the constraints of expensive FHE computations, we design a novel differential testing tool called HEDIFF, which leverages the margin metric on the plaintext model as guidance to drive targeted testing on FHE models. For the identified deviation inputs, we further analyze them to determine whether they exhibit general noise patterns that are transferable. We evaluate HEDIFF using three popular HE-ML frameworks, covering 12 different combinations of models and datasets. HEDIFF successfully detected hundreds of deviation inputs across almost every tested FHE framework and model. We also quantitatively show that the identified deviation inputs are (visually) meaningful in comparison to regular inputs. Further schematic analysis reveals the root cause of these deviant inputs and allows us to generalize their noise patterns for more directed testing. Our work sheds light on enabling robust HE-ML for real-world usage.
Yiteng Peng, Daoyuan Wu, Zhibo Liu 0001, Dongwei Xiao, Zhenlan Ji, Juergen Rahmel, Shuai Wang 0011
ICSE6
2025 SelfDefend: LLMs Can Defend Themselves against Jailbreaking in a Practical Manner
Xunguang Wang, Daoyuan Wu, Zhenlan Ji, Zongjie Li, Pingchuan Ma 0004, Shuai Wang 0011, Yingjiu Li, Yang Liu 0003, Juergen Rahmel
USENIX Security Symposium10