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Fredrik Nestaas

dblp:381/0554 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Information retrieval · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model security
adversarial attacks on language models
0.912025
Adversarial Search Engine Optimization for Large Language Models · ICLR 2025
Information retrieval › web search
search engine optimization
0.312025
Adversarial Search Engine Optimization for Large Language Models · ICLR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

prompt manipulation · 2.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Adversarial Search Engine Optimization for Large Language Models
abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications where the model selects from competing third-party content, such as in LLM-powered search engines or chatbot plugins. In this paper, we introduce _Preference Manipulation Attacks_, a new class of attacks that manipulate an LLM's selections to favor the attacker. We demonstrate that carefully crafted website content or plugin documentations can trick an LLM to promote the attacker products and discredit competitors, thereby increasing user traffic and monetization (a form of adversarial Search Engine Optimization). We show this can lead to a _prisoner's dilemma_, where all parties are incentivized to launch attacks, but this collectively degrades the LLM's outputs for everyone. We demonstrate our attacks on production LLM search engines (Bing and Perplexity) and plugin APIs (for GPT-4 and Claude). As LLMs are increasingly used to rank third-party content, we expect Preference Manipulation Attacks to emerge as a significant threat.
Fredrik Nestaas, Edoardo Debenedetti, Florian Tramèr
ICLR1