Gao Zuchen, Zizheng Zhan, Xianming Li, Erxin Yu, Haotian Zhang, Chenbin Chenbin, Yuqun Zhang, Jing Li. Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2025.

Recent advances in LLM-based decompilers have been shown effective to convert low-level binaries into human-readable source code. However, there still lacks a comprehensive benchmark that provides large-scale binary-source function pairs, which is critical for advancing the LLM decompilation technology. Creating accurate binary-source mappings incurs severe issues caused by complex compilation settings and widespread function inlining that obscure the correspondence between binaries and their original source code. Previous efforts have either relied on used contest‐style benchmarks, synthetic binary–source mappings that diverge significantly from the mappings in real world, or partially matched binaries with only code lines or variable names, compromising the effectiveness of analyzing the binary functionality. To alleviate these issues, we introduce Decompile-Bench, the first open-source dataset comprising two million binary-source function pairs condensed from 100 million collected function pairs, i.e., 450GB of binaries compiled from permissively licensed GitHub projects. For the evaluation purposes, we also developed a benchmark Decompile-Bench-Eval including manually crafted binaries from the well-established HumanEval and MBPP, alongside the compiled GitHub repositories released after 2025 to mitigate data leakage issues. We further explore commonly-used evaluation metrics to provide a thorough assessment of the studied LLM decompilers and find that fine-tuning with Decompile-Bench causes a 20% improvement over previous benchmarks in terms of the re-executability rate. Our code and data has been released in HuggingFace and Github. https://github.com/anonepo/LLM4Decompile

As large language models (LLMs) constantly evolve, ensuring their safety remains a critical research issue.Previous red teaming approaches for LLM safety have primarily focused on single prompt attack or goal hijacking.To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study LLM safety in multi-turn dialogue coreference.We created a dataset of 1, 400 questions across 14 categories, each featuring multi-turn coreference safety attacks.We then conducted detailed evaluations on five widely used open-source LLMs.The results indicated that under multi-turn coreference safety attacks, the highest attack successful rate was 56% with the LLaMA2-Chat-7b model, while the lowest was 13.9% with the Mistral-7B-Instruct model.These findings highlight the safety vulnerabilities in LLMs during dialogue coreference interactions.Warning: This paper may contain offensive language or harmful content. 1