Jonas Kaspereit

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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

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Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 SoK: A Taxonomy for Cybersecurity Incident Response Influence Factors
abstract
Cybersecurity incident response has emerged as a critical area of interest for both researchers and practitioners. The corpus of literature on cybersecurity incident response is expanding, yet a unified framework for systematically organizing the accumulated knowledge remains absent. The aspects of incident response span multiple domains, including technology, human-computer interaction, organizational theory, and human factors. A comprehensive, integrative perspective on these factors can enable researchers to identify underexplored areas and more effectively target their empirical and theoretical investigations. Our study systematizes the factors that influence organizational preparedness for and response to cybersecurity incidents. Through a systematic review of academic literature (n = 417) and non-scientific publications (n = 40), we derived the "Cybersecurity Incident Response Influencing Factor Taxonomy" (\textit{CIR-IF Taxonomy}). Existing empirical findings were classified within this taxonomy, providing a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of knowledge from the period 1999 to mid-2024. The taxonomy categories were systematically compared with seven established scientific frameworks and with the \textit{NIST Cyber Security Framework} elements referenced in the \textit{NIST Special Publication 800-61r3} incident response profile. The results of this comparison show that the \textit{CIR-IF Taxonomy} delivers a richer, more rigorous, and more systematically organized view of the factors that drive and shape incident response.
Thomas Biege, Marius Brockhoff, Jonas Kaspereit, Fabian Ising, Lea Gröber, Sebastian Schinzel
EuroS&P3
2025 Characterizing Hosting and Security Practices for Public-Facing LDAP Servers
abstract
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is widely used to make structured data available for standardized lookup, which may sometimes include personal information or authentication credentials. Previous work, including ours, found security issues such as public LDAP servers leaking sensitive information without prior authentication and server configurations with poor communication security. However, prior work did not investigate whether, or to what extent, the identified problems are linked to hosting and management setups. In this paper, we address this gap and explore the organizations hosting publicfacing LDAP servers. We identify the network segments more likely to host LDAP instances, the products and operating systems used, and examine the management practices related to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) setups for LDAP. In contrast to studies on Web and email, which have revealed strong centralization tendencies in deployment, we show that the LDAP ecosystem is diverse, with a wide range of different hosting networks. In this study, we identify 69.1 k LDAP instances- $6.5 \times$ more than prior work-and map these to the respective LDAP products. We find that 5.8% of the servers use a product that is end-of-life or runs on a deprecated OS. We identify servers using problematic X. 509 certificates, e.g., those associated with publicly known private keys. From our observations, we give recommendations for network operators to improve their security posture.
Gustavo Luvizotto Cesar, Gurur Öndarö, Jonas Kaspereit, Fabian Ising, Sebastian Schinzel, Mattijs Jonker, Ralph Holz
CNSM3
2025 S/MINE: Collecting and Analyzing S/MIME Certificates at Scale
Gurur Öndarö, Jonas Kaspereit, Samson Umezulike, Christoph Saatjohann, Fabian Ising, Sebastian Schinzel
USENIX Security Symposium2
2024 LanDscAPe: Exploring LDAP weaknesses and data leaks at Internet scale
Jonas Kaspereit, Gurur Öndarö, Gustavo Luvizotto Cesar, Simon Ebbers, Fabian Ising, Christoph Saatjohann, Mattijs Jonker, Ralph Holz, Sebastian Schinzel
USENIX Security Symposium1