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Ronald E. Thompson III

dblp:381/1653 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0000-8726-6570ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 32% Privacy and data protection · 30% Systems and software security · 23%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Requirements engineering and software design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
medical device security
1.122026
"There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Beyond Clinical Risk: An Experimental Study of Cybersecurity Informed Consent and Patient Choice for Connected Medical Devices · CHI 2026
Privacy and data protection › privacy compliance › consent
informed consent
1.012026
Beyond Clinical Risk: An Experimental Study of Cybersecurity Informed Consent and Patient Choice for Connected Medical Devices · CHI 2026
Systems and software security › security engineering
threat modeling
0.812024
"There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

qualitative study · 1.7interviews · 1.7vignette experiment · 1.0threat modeling · 0.8interview study · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Beyond Clinical Risk: An Experimental Study of Cybersecurity Informed Consent and Patient Choice for Connected Medical Devices
abstract
Internet-connected medical devices introduce complex cybersecurity risks that challenge the established practice of informed consent. It remains unclear how patients weigh these abstract, dynamic threats against concrete clinical benefits. We present findings from a large-scale (N=2,666) vignette-based experiment designed to uncover the factors driving patient decision-making. Participants chose whether to adopt a connected pacemaker, weighing its enhanced clinical outcomes against potential vulnerabilities. We systematically varied communication factors, including the source of risk information (e.g., clinician, FDA), risk framing, and the details of a subsequent vulnerability disclosure. Our results reveal patient choice hinges on pre-existing physician trust and risk framing. We did not observe any effect from the information’s source. We also find initial choices act as powerful anchors, and that detailed disclosures increase security confidence. Our work provides crucial empirical evidence on this trade-off, offering actionable guidance to better support informed consent for life-critical connected technologies.
Ronald E. Thompson III, R. Harrison Sweet, Christian J. Dameff, Jeffrey L. Tully, Daniel Votipka
CHI1
2025 "Threat modeling is very formal, it's very technical, and also very hard to do correctly": Investigating Threat Modeling Practices in Open-Source Software Projects
Harjot Kaur, Carson Powers, Ronald E. Thompson III, Sascha Fahl, Daniel Votipka
USENIX Security Symposium3
2024 "There are rabbit holes I want to go down that I'm not allowed to go down": An Investigation of Security Expert Threat Modeling Practices for Medical Devices
Ronald E. Thompson III, Madeline McLaughlin, Carson Powers, Daniel Votipka
USENIX Security Symposium1