Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Hailey Nguyen
dblp:383/6759
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 87% Language models and text generation · 13% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
adversarial defense |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation Safety · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation Safety · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › generative model safety
safe generation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation Safety · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety
safety alignment |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation Safety · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester · ICML 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › red teaming
automated red teaming |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester · ICML 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › jailbreak attack
multi-turn jailbreak |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
text generation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation Safety · ICLR 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
large language model · 1.7agentic prompting · 1.7adversarial prompting techniques · 1.7supervised fine-tuning · 0.9direct preference optimization · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Backtracking Improves Generation SafetyabstractText generation has a fundamental limitation almost by definition: there is no taking back tokens that have been generated, even when they are clearly problematic.
In the context of language model safety, when a partial unsafe generation is produced, language models by their nature tend to happily keep on generating similarly unsafe additional text.
This is in fact how safety alignment of frontier models gets circumvented in the wild, despite great efforts in improving their safety.
Deviating from the paradigm of approaching safety alignment as prevention (decreasing the probability of harmful responses), we propose backtracking, a technique that allows language models to "undo" and recover from their own unsafe generation through the introduction of a special [RESET] token.
Our method can be incorporated into either SFT or DPO training to optimize helpfulness and harmlessness.
We show that models trained to backtrack are consistently safer than baseline models: backtracking Llama-3-8B is four times more safe than the baseline model (6.1\% $\to$ 1.5\%) in our evaluations without regression in helpfulness.
Our method additionally provides protection against four adversarial attacks including an adaptive attack, despite not being trained to do so. Jianfeng Chi, Hailey Nguyen, Kartikeya Upasani, Dan Bikel, Jason Weston, Eric Michael Smith |
ICLR | 3 |
| 2025 | Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent TesterabstractRed teaming aims to assess how large language models (LLMs) can produce content that violates norms, policies, and rules set forth during their safety training. However, most existing automated methods in literature are not representative of the way common users exploit the multi-turn conversational nature of AI models. While manual testing addresses this gap, it is an inefficient and often expensive process. To address these limitations, we introduce the Generative Offensive Agent Tester (GOAT), an automated agentic red teaming system that simulates plain language adversarial conversations while leveraging multiple adversarial prompting techniques to identify vuLnerabilities in LLMs. We instantiate GOAT with 7 red teaming attacks by prompting a general purpose model in a way that encourages reasoning through the choices of methods available, the current target model’s response, and the next steps. Our approach is designed to be extensible and efficient, allowing human testers to focus on exploring new areas of risk while automation covers the scaled adversarial stress-testing of known risk territory. We present the design and evaluation of GOAT, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art LLMs, with an ASR@10 of 96% against smaller models such as Llama 3.1 8B, and 91% against Llama 3.1 70B and 94% for GPT-4o when evaluated against larger models on the JailbreakBench dataset. Maya Pavlova, Erik Brinkman, Krithika Iyer, Vitor Albiero, Joanna Bitton, Hailey Nguyen, Cristian Canton, Ivan Evtimov, Aaron Grattafiori |
ICML | 6 |