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Abdelouahab Benchikh

dblp:384/9222 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100%

Topics — the 1 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › operating system security
kernel integrity
0.912025
System Register Hijacking: Compromising Kernel Integrity By Turning System Registers Against the System · USENIX Security Symposium 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

register manipulation · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 ARVO: Atlas of Reproducible Vulnerabilities for Open-Source Software
abstract
Achieving reproducibility, quantity, and diversity in vulnerability datasets has long been viewed as an inherent three-way trade-off, where improving one dimension often comes at the cost of the others. In practice, reproducibility has been the dimension most often neglected. This has limited what can be automatically extracted from historical bug datasets, and has reduced their utility for downstream security research. In this work, we propose a method to produce a new security dataset which ensures reproducibility for diverse vulnerabilities at scale by identifying the key obstacles to large-scale bug reproduction and addressing them with general solutions. Using this method, we introduce full reproducibility to the largest open source software vulnerability dataset (OSS-Fuzz) and construct the ARVO dataset (an Atlas of Reproducible Vulnerabilities in Open-source software). ARVO is a large-scale dataset consisting of over 6,100 real-world vulnerabilities across 311 projects. Focusing on reproducibility, ARVO differs from existing datasets by providing each vulnerability in a form that can be consistently rebuilt, triggered, and analyzed across versions. Reproducibility also enables automatic identification of the corresponding patch for each vulnerability and supports direct interaction with vulnerabilities after code changes, capabilities that existing large-scale datasets do not provide. In our evaluation, ARVO successfully reproduces 81% of vulnerabilities and achieves 89.4% accuracy on the located patches. We also discuss ARVO's influence on both upstream practices and downstream security research.
Xiang Mei, Jordi Del Castillo, Pulkit Singh Singaria, Haoran Xi, Abdelouahab Benchikh, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang 0001, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Adam Doupé, Hammond A. Pearce, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt
EuroS&P5
2025 System Register Hijacking: Compromising Kernel Integrity By Turning System Registers Against the System
Manas Ghandat, Kyle Zeng, Abdelouahab Benchikh, Tiffany Bao, Ruoyu Wang 0001, Adam Doupé, Yan Shoshitaishvili
USENIX Security Symposium5