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Sönke Huster

dblp:385/6588 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless networking · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery › fuzzing
driver fuzzing
0.812024
To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO Devices · SP 2024
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery › fuzzing
kernel fuzzing
0.812024
To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO Devices · SP 2024
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.812024
To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO Devices · SP 2024
Wireless networking
wireless network protocols
0.212024
To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO Devices · SP 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

proxy-based input collection · 1.5VirtIO-based fuzzing · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 To Boldly Go Where No Fuzzer Has Gone Before: Finding Bugs in Linux' Wireless Stacks through VirtIO Devices
abstract
The security of Linux kernel interfaces is paramount in preventing over-the-air, proximity, or other network attacks. The Linux kernel is fuzzed continuously to detect newly introduced bugs. Despite their long runtime, existing fuzzers fail to detect critical bugs, as they are unaware of physical device semantics and difficult to adapt to new devices. This paper proposes a novel fuzzer called VirtFuzz, which is based on Virtual I/O (VirtIO) device drivers. A proxy mechanism enables data collection from physical device interaction. These collected inputs are then used to fuzz through a virtual device. Using our universal VirtIO device, VirtFuzz is generic and can be easily adapted to various Linux VirtIO kernel drivers and their related subsystems. We use this approach to fuzz the Linux Bluetooth and Wireless LAN (WLAN) stacks. To demonstrate the adaptability of our approach, we additionally provide implementations to fuzz the networking and input stack. We find 31 new, manually confirmed bugs, with 6 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposuress (CVEs) assigned.
Sönke Huster, Matthias Hollick, Jiska Classen
SP1