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Teshi Meng

dblp:389/4888 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0003-2559-225XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 45% Security and privacy of machine learning · 31% Network security · 25%
Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper
Audio and music processing · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection
attack detection
1.012026
A Passive Defense Against Out-of-Band Injection Threats to Microphone-Based Devices · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Cyber-physical and IoT security
sensor security
1.012026
A Passive Defense Against Out-of-Band Injection Threats to Microphone-Based Devices · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.812024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024
Cyber-physical and IoT security › autonomous vehicle security
LiDAR perception attack
0.812024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
physical adversarial attack
0.812024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024
Audio and music processing › speech processing
speech disentanglement
0.312026
A Passive Defense Against Out-of-Band Injection Threats to Microphone-Based Devices · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Cyber-physical and IoT security
autonomous vehicle security
0.212024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024
Network security › wireless network security › physical layer security
electromagnetic interference attack
0.212024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024
Cyber-physical and IoT security › sensor security
sensor attack
0.212024
EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception · SenSys 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

speech disentanglement · 2.0entropy-based chaos quantification · 2.0intentional electromagnetic interference · 0.8deep neural network · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 A Passive Defense Against Out-of-Band Injection Threats to Microphone-Based Devices
abstract
The integration of microphones into a broad array of devices, from consumer electronics to industrial sensors, introduces vulnerabilities to out-of-band injection attacks, including ultrasound, laser, electromagnetic, and magnetic field attacks. These attacks enable adversaries to inject inaudible or imperceptible commands, compromising systems without direct physical access. This paper presents a robust, passive detection framework designed to address the full spectrum of out-of-band attacks on microphone-equipped devices. Unlike prior approaches, our system leverages advanced speech disentanglement to separate semantic and acoustic features from recorded audio, enabling a refined analysis of injection artifacts within each feature domain. By quantifying entropy-based chaos within the disen tangled representations, we detect subtle spectral and structural irregularities indicative of injected signals. The system further incorporates a preliminary stage to identify carrier traces where applicable, expediting detection in cases such as ultrasound and laser attacks. Extensive evaluations across various device types, including smartphones, tablets, and microphones, demonstrate the system's high accuracy and stability, achieving an AUC of 98% under diverse conditions and attack configurations.
Feng Lin 0004, Tiantian Liu 0002, Teshi Meng, Zhongjie Ba, Li Lu 0008, Kui Ren 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3
2024 EMTrig: Physical Adversarial Examples Triggered by Electromagnetic Injection towards LiDAR Perception
abstract
LiDAR sensors measure the environment by emitting lasers and, when combined with deep neural networks (DNNs), can effectively identify surrounding obstacles such as vehicles and pedestrians. Given its crucial role in autonomous driving perception, the security of LiDAR is closely tied to driving safety. Some studies have explored its vulnerabilities to physical-world attacks, such as laser-based attacks or adversarial objects. However, these methods are either extremely difficult to execute or lack stealth and flexibility. In this paper, we propose a novel attack method called EMTrig, which leverages common roadside objects combined with controlled intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) targeting specific LiDARs to create flexible and covert adversarial attacks against designated vehicles. This causes the victim vehicle to misidentify roadside objects as obstacles, such as other vehicles, leading to dangerous driving behaviors like sudden stops and lane changes. Unlike conventional adversarial examples, our deployed objects are common items (e.g., signboards) that are harmless without the IEMI trigger but pose a threat only under IEMI attacks, providing better stealthiness and flexibility. Extensive experiments in both digital and physical domains validate the effectiveness of EMTrig, demonstrating its significant threat to LiDAR perception.
Ziwei Liu 0007, Feng Lin 0004, Teshi Meng, Benaouda Chouaib Baha-eddine, Li Lu 0008, Kui Ren 0001
SenSys3