Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jay Bal
dblp:39/1424
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-1791-674XORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network management and operations · 56% Network measurement and analytics · 44% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Usable security · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network management and operations
attack graph |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Network measurement and analytics
attack modeling |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Usable security
security visualization |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
fault tree · 0.7factorial design · 0.7empirical evaluation · 0.7attack graph · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Evaluating practitioner cyber-security attack graph configuration preferences
Harjinder Singh Lallie 0001, Kurt Debattista, Jay Bal |
Comput. Secur. | 3 |
| 2018 | An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack PerceptionabstractPerceiving and understanding cyber-attacks can be a difficult task. This problem is widely recognized and welldocumented, and more effective techniques are needed to aid cyber-attack perception. Attack modeling techniques (AMTs), such as attack graphs and fault trees, are useful visual aids that can aid cyber-attack perception; however, there is little empirical or comparative research which evaluates the effectiveness of these methods. This paper reports the results of an empirical evaluation between an adapted attack graph method and the fault tree standard to determine which of the two methods is more effective in aiding cyber-attack perception. An empirical evaluation (n = 63) was conducted through a 3 × 2 × 2 factorial design. Participants from computer-science and non-computerscience backgrounds were divided into an adapted attack graph and fault tree group and then asked to complete three tests which tested the ability to recall, comprehend, and apply the AMT. A mean assessment score (mas) was calculated for each test. The results show that the adapted attack graph method is more effective at aiding cyber-attack perception when compared with the fault tree method (p <; 0.01). Participants that have a computer science background outperformed other participants when using both methods (p <; 0.05). These results indicate that the adapted attack graph method can be an effective tool for aiding cyber-attack perception amongst experts. This paper underlines the need for further comparisons in a broader range of settings involving additional techniques, and makes several suggestions for further work. Harjinder Singh Lallie 0001, Kurt Debattista, Jay Bal |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 3 |
| 2014 | Orchestrating New Markets Using Cloud Services
Jay Bal, Ahmad Issa, Xiao Ma 0013 |
PRO-VE | 1 |
| 2010 | A Competence-Based Collaborative Network: The West Midlands Collaborative Commerce Marketplace
Yen Cheung, Helana Scheepers, Mark Swift, Vincent Cheng-Siong Lee, Jay Bal |
PRO-VE | 5 |