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Jay Bal

dblp:39/1424 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-1791-674XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
1 paper
Network management and operations · 56% Network measurement and analytics · 44%
Network and information security
1 paper
Usable security · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network management and operations
attack graph
0.312018
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018
Network measurement and analytics
attack modeling
0.312018
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018
Usable security
security visualization
0.312018
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

fault tree · 0.7factorial design · 0.7empirical evaluation · 0.7attack graph · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Evaluating practitioner cyber-security attack graph configuration preferences
Harjinder Singh Lallie 0001, Kurt Debattista, Jay Bal
Comput. Secur.3
2018 An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Attack Graphs and Fault Trees in Cyber-Attack Perception
abstract
Perceiving and understanding cyber-attacks can be a difficult task. This problem is widely recognized and welldocumented, and more effective techniques are needed to aid cyber-attack perception. Attack modeling techniques (AMTs), such as attack graphs and fault trees, are useful visual aids that can aid cyber-attack perception; however, there is little empirical or comparative research which evaluates the effectiveness of these methods. This paper reports the results of an empirical evaluation between an adapted attack graph method and the fault tree standard to determine which of the two methods is more effective in aiding cyber-attack perception. An empirical evaluation (n = 63) was conducted through a 3 × 2 × 2 factorial design. Participants from computer-science and non-computerscience backgrounds were divided into an adapted attack graph and fault tree group and then asked to complete three tests which tested the ability to recall, comprehend, and apply the AMT. A mean assessment score (mas) was calculated for each test. The results show that the adapted attack graph method is more effective at aiding cyber-attack perception when compared with the fault tree method (p <; 0.01). Participants that have a computer science background outperformed other participants when using both methods (p <; 0.05). These results indicate that the adapted attack graph method can be an effective tool for aiding cyber-attack perception amongst experts. This paper underlines the need for further comparisons in a broader range of settings involving additional techniques, and makes several suggestions for further work.
Harjinder Singh Lallie 0001, Kurt Debattista, Jay Bal
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.3
2014 Orchestrating New Markets Using Cloud Services
Jay Bal, Ahmad Issa, Xiao Ma 0013
PRO-VE1
2010 A Competence-Based Collaborative Network: The West Midlands Collaborative Commerce Marketplace
Yen Cheung, Helana Scheepers, Mark Swift, Vincent Cheng-Siong Lee, Jay Bal
PRO-VE5