Internet communication today typically involves intermediary middleboxes like caches, compression proxies, or virus scanners. Unfortunately, as encryption becomes more widespread, these middleboxes become blind and we lose their security, functionality, and performance benefits. Despite initial efforts in both industry and academia, we remain unsure how to integrate middleboxes into secure sessions---it is not even clear how to define "secure" in this multi-entity context.

Tremendous effort has gone into the ongoing battle to make webpages load faster. This effort has culminated in new protocols (QUIC, SPDY, and HTTP/2) as well as novel content delivery mechanisms. In addition, companies like Google and SpeedCurve investigated how to measure "page load time" (PLT) in a way that captures human perception. In this paper we present Eyeorg [12], a platform for crowdsourcing web quality of experience measurements. Eyeorg overcomes the scaling and automation challenges of recruiting users and collecting consistent user-perceived quality measurements. We validate Eyeorg's capabilities via a set of 100 trusted participants. Next, we showcase its functionalities via three measurement campaigns, each involving 1,000 paid participants, to 1) study the quality of several PLT metrics, 2) compare HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 performance, and 3) assess the impact of online advertisements and ad blockers on user experience. We find that commonly used, and even novel and sophisticated PLT metrics fail to represent actual human perception of PLT, that the performance gains from HTTP/2 are imperceivable in some circumstances, and that not all ad blockers are created equal.

Online privacy is more important now than ever. Using encryption goes a long way by hiding application data from third parties, but some amount of private information is still exposed in packet headers. Tools like Tor are designed to address this concern, and, more recently, research efforts to replace IP have begun to consider how a network architecture itself can improve privacy.

Live video delivery is expected to reach a peak of 50 Tbps this year. This surging popularity is fundamentally changing the Internet video delivery landscape. CDNs must meet users' demands for fast join times, high bitrates, and low buffering ratios, while minimizing their own cost of delivery and responding to issues in real-time. Wide-area latency, loss, and failures, as well as varied workloads ("mega-events" to long-tail), make meeting these demands challenging.

A significant fraction of Internet traffic is now encrypted and HTTPS will likely be the default in HTTP/2. However, Transport Layer Security (TLS), the standard protocol for encryption in the Internet, assumes that all functionality resides at the endpoints, making it impossible to use in-network services that optimize network resource usage, improve user experience, and protect clients and servers from security threats. Re-introducing in-network functionality into TLS sessions today is done through hacks, often weakening overall security.

Increased user concern over security and privacy on the Internet has led to widespread adoption of HTTPS, the secure version of HTTP. HTTPS authenticates the communicating end points and provides confidentiality for the ensuing communication. However, as with any security solution, it does not come for free. HTTPS may introduce overhead in terms of infrastructure costs, communication latency, data usage, and energy consumption. Moreover, given the opaqueness of the encrypted communication, any in-network value added services requiring visibility into application layer content, such as caches and virus scanners, become ineffective.

User-created live video streaming is marking a fundamental shift in the workload of live video delivery. However, live-video-specific challenges and the viral nature of user-created content makes it difficult for current CDNs to deliver 1) high-quality, 2) highly-scalable, and 3) highly-responsive service. We present the design and implementation of VDN, a new control plane for CDNs designed to optimize the delivery of live streams within the CDN. VDN satisfies these requirements by using two approaches: 1) optimizing directly for video quality (not just throughput) and 2) combining centralized control with local control, allowing VDN to adapt to traffic dynamics and network failures at fine timescales.

Though most would agree that accountability and privacy are both valuable, today's Internet provides little support for either. Previous efforts have explored ways to offer stronger guarantees for one of the two, typically at the expense of the other; indeed, at first glance accountability and privacy appear mutually exclusive. At the center of the tussle is the source address: in an accountable Internet, source addresses undeniably link packets and senders so hosts can be punished for bad behavior. In a privacy-preserving Internet, source addresses are hidden as much as possible.

eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA) [1] is an architecture that natively supports multiple communication types and allows networks to evolve their abstractions and functionality to accommodate new styles of communication over time. XIA embeds an elegant mechanism for handling unforeseen communication types for legacy routers.