In this paper we study admissible extensions of several theories T of reverse mathematics. The idea is that in such an extension the structure M = ( N , S , ∈ ) of the natural numbers and collection of sets of natural numbers S has to obey the axioms of T while simultaneously one also has a set-theoretic world with transfinite levels erected on top of M governed by the axioms of Kripke-Platek set theory, KP . In some respects, the admissible extension of T can be viewed as a proof-theoretic analog of Barwise's admissible cover of an arbitrary model of set theory; see [2] . However, by contrast, the admissible extension of T is usually not a conservative extension of T . Owing to the interplay of T and KP , either theory's axioms may force new sets of naturals to exist which in turn may engender yet new sets of naturals on account of the axioms of the other. The paper discerns a general pattern though. It turns out that for many familiar theories T , the second order part of the admissible cover of T equates to T augmented by transfinite induction over all initial segments of the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Technically, the paper uses a novel type of ordinal analysis, expanding that for KP to the higher set-theoretic universe while at the same time treating the world of subsets of N as an unanalyzed class-sized urelement structure. Among the systems of reverse mathematics, for which we determine the admissible extension, are Π 1 1 - CA 0 and ATR 0 as well as the theory of bar induction, BI .

In this work we consider an extension MFcind of the Minimalist Foundation MF for predicative constructive mathematics with the addition of inductive and coinductive definitions sufficient to generate Sambin's Positive topologies, namely Martin-L\"of-Sambin formal topologies equipped with a Positivity relation (used to describe pointfree formal closed subsets). In particular the intensional level of MFcind, called mTTcind, is defined by extending with coinductive definitions another theory mTTind extending the intensional level mTT of MF with the sole addition of inductive definitions. In previous work we have shown that mTTind is consistent with Formal Church's Thesis CT and the Axiom of Choice AC via an interpretation in Aczel's CZF+REA. Our aim is to show the expectation that the addition of coinductive definitions to mTTind does not increase its consistency strength by reducing the consistency of mTTcind+CT+AC to the consistency of CZF+REA through various interpretations. We actually reach our goal in two ways. One way consists in first interpreting mTTcind+CT+AC in the theory extending CZF with the Union Regular Extension Axiom, REA_U, a strengthening of REA, and the Axiom of Relativized Dependent Choice, RDC. The theory CZF+REA_U+RDC is then interpreted in MLS*, a version of Martin-L\"of's type theory with Palmgren's superuniverse S. A last step consists in interpreting MLS* back into CZF+REA. The alternative way consists in first interpreting mTTcind+AC+CT directly in a version of Martin-L\"of's type theory with Palmgren's superuniverse extended with CT, which is then interpreted back to CZF+REA. A key benefit of the first way is that the theory CZF+REA_U+RDC also supports the intended set-theoretic interpretation of the extensional level of MFcind. Finally, all the theories considered, except mTTcind+AC+CT, are shown to be of the same proof-theoretic strength.

Abstract In generic realizability for set theories, realizers treat unbounded quantifiers generically. To this form of realizability, we add another layer of extensionality by requiring that realizers ought to act extensionally on realizers, giving rise to a realizability universe $\mathrm{V_{ex}}(A)$ in which the axiom of choice in all finite types, ${\textsf{AC}}_{{\textsf{FT}}}$, is realized, where $A$ stands for an arbitrary partial combinatory algebra. This construction furnishes ‘inner models’ of many set theories that additionally validate ${\textsf{AC}}_{{\textsf{FT}}}$, in particular it provides a self-validating semantics for ${\textsf{CZF}}$ (constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory) and ${\textsf{IZF}}$ (intuitionistic Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory). One can also add large set axioms and many other principles.

Abstract We develop a number of variants of Lifschitz realizability for $\mathbf {CZF}$ by building topological models internally in certain realizability models. We use this to show some interesting metamathematical results about constructive set theory with variants of the lesser limited principle of omniscience including consistency with unique Church’s thesis, consistency with some Brouwerian principles and variants of the numerical existence property.

Abstract While power Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, shares many properties with ordinary Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}$, in several ways it behaves quite differently from ${\textbf{KP}}$. This is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by a result, due to Mathias, to the effect that adding the axiom of constructibility to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ gives rise to a much stronger theory, whereas in the case of ${\textbf{KP}}$, the constructible hierarchy provides an inner model, so that ${\textbf{KP}}$ and ${\textbf{KP}}+V=L$ have the same strength. This paper will be concerned with the relationship between ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ and ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ plus the axiom of choice or even the global axiom of choice, $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$. Since $L$ is the standard vehicle to furnish a model in which this axiom holds, the usual argument for demonstrating that the addition of ${\textbf{AC}}$ or $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ does not increase proof-theoretic strength does not apply in any obvious way. Among other tools, the paper uses techniques from ordinal analysis to show that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ has the same strength as ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, thereby answering a question of Mathias. Moreover, it is shown that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ is conservative over ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ for $\varPi ^1_4$ statements of analysis. The method of ordinal analysis for theories with power set was developed in an earlier paper. The technique allows one to compute witnessing information from infinitary proofs, providing bounds for the transfinite iterations of the power set operation that are provable in a theory. As the theory ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ provides a very useful tool for defining models and realizability models of other theories that are hard to construct without access to a uniform selection mechanism, it is desirable to determine its exact proof-theoretic strength. This knowledge can for instance be used to determine the strength of Feferman’s operational set theory with power set operation as well as constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.

Abstract The paper proves a conjecture of Solomon Feferman concerning the indefiniteness of the continuum hypothesis relative to a semi-intuitionistic set theory.

Abstract This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.

Abstract This paper proves that the disjunction property, the numerical existence property. Church's rule, and several other metamathematical properties hold true for Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, CZF, and also for the theory CZF augmented by the Regular Extension Axiom. As regards the proof technique, it features a self-validating semantics for CZF that combines realizability for extensional set theory and truth.

Abstract This paper continues investigations of the monotone fixed point principle in the context of Feferman's explicit mathematics begun in [14]. Explicit mathematics is a versatile formal framework for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics and generalized recursion theory. The object of investigation here is the theory of explicit mathematics augmented by the monotone fixed point principle, which asserts that any monotone operation on classifications (Feferman's notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, the new axiom not merely postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new constant to the language, it is ensured that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation. Let T0 + UMID denote this extension of explicit mathematics. [14] gave lower bounds for the strength of two subtheories of To + UMID in relating them to fragments of second order arithmetic based on comprehension. [14] showed that To ↾ + UMID and To ↾ + INDk + UMID have at least the strength of ( – CA), and ↾ and – CA), respectively. Here we are concerned with the exact reversals. Let UMIDN be the monotone fixed-point principle for subclassifications of the natural numbers. Among other results, it is shown that To ↾ + UMIDN and To ↾ + INDN + UMIDN have the same strength as ( – CA) ↾ and ( – CA), respectively. The results are achieved by constructing set-theoretic models for the aforementioned systems of explicit mathematics in certain extensions of Kripke-Platek set theory and subsequently relating these set theories to subsystems of second arithmetic.

Abstract The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, a formal framework serving many purposes. It is suitable for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics as well as generalized recursion, including direct expression of structural concepts which admit self-application. The object of investigation here is the theory of explicit mathematics augmented by the monotone fixed point principle, which asserts that any monotone operation on classifications (Feferman's notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, the new axiom not merely postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new functional constant to the language, it is ensured that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation. The upshot of the paper is that the latter extension of explicit mathematics (when based on classical logic) embodies considerable proof-theoretic strength. It is shown that it has at least the strength of the subsystem of second order arithmetic based on comprehension.

We characterize the proof-theoretic strength of systems of explicit mathematics with a general principle (MID) asserting the existence of least fixed points for monotone inductive definitions, in terms of certain systems of analysis and set theory. In the case of analysis, these are systems which contain the Σ 1 2 -axiom of choice and Π 1 2 -comprehension for formulas without set parameters. In the case of set theory, these are systems containing the Kripke-Platek axioms for a recursively inaccessible universe together with the existence of a stable ordinal. In all cases, the exact strength depends on what forms of induction are admitted in the respective systems.

Abstract The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, T0. We address a problem that was posed in [6]. Let MID be the principle stating that any monotone operation on classifications has a least fixed point. The main objective of this paper is to show that T0 + MID, when based on classical logic, also proves the existence of non-monotone inductive definitions that arise from arbitrary extensional operations on classifications. From the latter we deduce that MID, when adjoined to classical T0, leads to a much stronger theory than T0.

Abstract Let KP− be the theory resulting from Kripke-Platek set theory by restricting Foundation to Set Foundation. Let G: V → V (V ≔ universe of sets) be a Δ0-definable set function, i.e. there is a Δ0-formula φ(x, y) such that φ(x, G(x)) is true for all sets x, and V ⊨ ∀x∃!yφ(x, y). In this paper we shall verify (by elementary proof-theoretic methods) that the collection of set functions primitive recursive in G coincides with the collection of those functions which are Σ1-definable in KP− + Σ1-Foundation + ∀x∃!yφ(x, y). Moreover, we show that this is still true if one adds Π1-Foundation or a weak version of Δ0-Dependent Choices to the latter theory.

Abstract For several subsystems of second order arithmeticTwe show that the proof-theoretic strength ofT+ (bar rule) can be characterized in terms ofT+ (bar induction)□, where the latter scheme arises from the scheme of bar induction by restricting it to well-orderings with no parameters. In addition, we demonstrate that ,ACA0+ (bar rule) andACA0+ (bar induction)□prove the same -sentences.