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Chusong Zhang

dblp:391/3430 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 62% Digital forensics and information hiding · 38%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › training data protection
dataset copyright auditing
0.912025
SoK: Dataset Copyright Auditing in Machine Learning Systems · SP 2025
Digital forensics and information hiding
watermarking
0.912025
SoK: Dataset Copyright Auditing in Machine Learning Systems · SP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
model intellectual property protection
0.312025
SoK: Dataset Copyright Auditing in Machine Learning Systems · SP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › model intellectual property protection
model watermarking
0.312025
SoK: Dataset Copyright Auditing in Machine Learning Systems · SP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

watermark injection · 0.9membership inference · 0.9fingerprinting · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 SoK: Dataset Copyright Auditing in Machine Learning Systems
abstract
As the implementation of machine learning (ML) systems becomes more widespread, especially with the introduction of larger ML models, we perceive a spring demand for massive data. However, it inevitably causes infringement and misuse problems with the data, such as using unauthorized online artworks or face images to train ML models. To address this problem, many efforts have been made to audit the copyright of the model training dataset. However, existing solutions vary in auditing assumptions and capabilities, making it difficult to compare their strengths and weaknesses. In addition, robustness evaluations usually consider only part of the ML pipeline and hardly reflect the performance of algorithms in real-world ML applications. Thus, it is essential to take a practical deployment perspective on the current dataset copyright auditing tools, examining their effectiveness and limitations. Concretely, we categorize dataset copyright auditing research into two prominent strands: intrusive methods and non-intrusive methods, depending on whether they require modifications to the original dataset. Then, we break down the intrusive methods into different watermark injection options and examine the non-intrusive methods using various finger-prints. To summarize our results, we offer detailed reference tables, highlight key points, and pinpoint unresolved issues in the current literature. By combining the pipeline in ML systems and analyzing previous studies, we highlight several future directions to make auditing tools more suitable for real-world copyright protection requirements.
Linkang Du, Xuanru Zhou, Min Chen 0032, Chusong Zhang, Zhou Su 0001, Peng Cheng 0001, Jiming Chen 0001, Zhikun Zhang 0001
SP4