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Chaoyuan Peng

dblp:392/3004 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0009-1295-9802ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
runtime security
0.812024
Toss a Fault to BpfChecker: Revealing Implementation Flaws for eBPF runtimes with Differential Fuzzing · CCS 2024
Software testing › fuzzing
differential fuzzing
0.812024
Toss a Fault to BpfChecker: Revealing Implementation Flaws for eBPF runtimes with Differential Fuzzing · CCS 2024
Software testing
differential testing
0.812024
Toss a Fault to BpfChecker: Revealing Implementation Flaws for eBPF runtimes with Differential Fuzzing · CCS 2024
Software testing
fuzzing
0.812024
Toss a Fault to BpfChecker: Revealing Implementation Flaws for eBPF runtimes with Differential Fuzzing · CCS 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

intermediate representation · 1.5differential fuzzing · 1.5constrained mutation · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Toss a Fault to BpfChecker: Revealing Implementation Flaws for eBPF runtimes with Differential Fuzzing
abstract
eBPF is a revolutionary technology that can run sandboxed programs in a privileged context and has an extensive range of applications, such as network monitoring on Linux kernel, denial-of-service protection on Windows, and the execution mechanism of smart contracts on blockchain. However, implementation flaws in eBPF have broad-reaching impact and serious consequences. Prior studies primarily focus on the memory safety of the eBPF runtimes, but few can detect implementation flaws (i.e., whether the implementation is correct). Meanwhile, existing implementation flaws detecting methods predominantly address bugs in the verifier, neglecting bugs in other components (i.e., the interpreter and the JIT compiler). In this paper, we present BpfChecker, a differential fuzzing framework to detect implementation flaws in the eBPF runtimes. It utilizes eBPF programs as input, performing differential testing for the critical states across various eBPF runtimes to uncover implementation flaws. To enhance the semantics of generated programs, we devise a lightweight intermediate representation and perform constrained mutations under the guidance of error messages. We have implemented a prototype of BpfChecker and extensively evaluated it on the three eBPF runtimes (i.e., Solana rBPF, vanilla rBPF, Windows eBPF). As a result, we have uncovered 28 new implementation flaws, received 2 CVEs and 800,000 bounty with developers' acknowledgment. More importantly, 2 of the newly found bugs can be used to create divergences in the execution layer of the Solana network.
Chaoyuan Peng, Muhui Jiang, Lei Wu 0012, Yajin Zhou
CCS1