Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Jessemyn Modini

dblp:393/0894 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 33% Usable security · 33% Malware analysis · 33%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Knowledge representation and reasoning · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › attack detection
advanced persistent threat detection
1.012026
SAGA: Synthetic Audit Log Generation for APT Campaigns · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Usable security › security operations
audit log analysis
1.012026
SAGA: Synthetic Audit Log Generation for APT Campaigns · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

deep learning · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 SAGA: Synthetic Audit Log Generation for APT Campaigns
abstract
With the increasing sophistication of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), the demand for effective detection and mitigation strategies and methods has escalated. Program execution leaves traces in the system audit log, which can be analyzed to detect malicious activities. However, collecting and analyzing large volumes of audit logs over extended periods is challenging, further compounded by insufficient labeling that hinders their usability. Addressing these challenges, this paper introduces SAGA (Synthetic Audit log Generation for APT campaigns), a novel approach for generating find-grained labeled synthetic audit logs that mimic real-world system logs while embedding stealthy APT attacks. SAGA generates configurable audit logs for arbitrary duration, blending benign logs from normal operations with malicious logs based on the definitions the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Malicious audit logs follow an APT lifecycle, incorporating various attack techniques at each stage. These synthetic logs can serve as benchmark datasets for training machine learning models and assessing diverse APT detection methods. To demonstrate the usefulness of synthetic audit logs, we ran established baselines of event-based technique hunting and APT campaign detection using various synthetic audit logs. In addition, we show that a deep learning model trained on synthetic audit logs can detect previously unseen techniques within audit logs.
Yi-Ting Huang, Ying-Ren Guo, Yu-Sheng Yang, Guo-Wei Wong, Yu-Zih Jheng, Yeali S. Sun, Jessemyn Modini, Timothy Lynar, Meng Chang Chen
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.7