We show a linear-size reduction from gap Max-2-Lin(2) (a generalization of the approximate Maximum Cut, or gap Max-Cut, problem) to γ-CVP_p for γ = O(1) and finite p ≥ 1, as well as a no-go theorem against poly-sized non-adaptive quantum reductions from k-SAT to CVP₂. This implies three headline results: (i) Faster algorithms for γ-CVP_p are also faster algorithms for Max-2-Lin(2) and Max-Cut. Depending on the approximation regime, even a 2^{0.78n}-time or 2^{0.3n}-time algorithm would improve upon state-of-the-art algorithms such as Williams' 2004 algorithm [TCS 2005] or Arora, Barak, and Steurer’s 2010 algorithm [JACM 2015]. This provides evidence that γ-CVP_p for γ = O(1) requires exponential time, improving upon the previous exponential lower-bound for γ-CVP₂ with γ < 3 by Bennett, Golovnev, and Stephens-Davidowitz [FOCS 2017]. (ii) A new almost 2^{(1/2 + ε/4ς + o(1)) n}-time classical algorithm and a new almost 2^{(1/3 + ε/6ς + o(1)) n}-time quantum algorithm for (1-ε, 1-ς)-gap Max-Cut. This algorithm is faster than the algorithm of Arora, Barak and Steurer [JACM 2015], as well as the algorithm of Williams [TCS 2005], and the algorithm of Manurangsi and Trevisan [APPROX 2018] when c₀ ε < ς < c₁ ε for constants c₀, c₁. (iii) If the Quantum Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (QSETH) can be used to show a 2^{δ n}-time lower-bound for Max-Cut, Max-2-Lin(2), or CVP₂ for any constant δ > 0, it must be via an adaptive quantum reduction unless NP ⊆ pr-QSZK. This illuminates some difficulties in characterizing the hardness of approximate constraint satisfaction problems and shows that the post-quantum security of lattice-based cryptography likely cannot be supported by QSETH. This result complements the no-go results of Aggarwal and Kumar [FOCS 2023], who showed that the classical security of lattice-based cryptography likely cannot be supported by the classical Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH).