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Francesco Diana

dblp:393/3176 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Efficient and distributed learning · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
attribute inference attack
0.912025
Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning
federated learning privacy
0.912025
Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
privacy leakage quantification
0.912025
Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning
0.312025
Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

reconstruction attack · 1.7model-based attack · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks
abstract
Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients, such as mobile phones and IoT devices, to collaboratively train a global machine learning model while keeping their data localized. However, recent studies have revealed that the training phase of FL is vulnerable to reconstruction attacks, such as attribute inference attacks (AIA), where adversaries exploit exchanged messages and auxiliary public information to uncover sensitive attributes of targeted clients. While these attacks have been extensively studied in the context of classification tasks, their impact on regression tasks remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing novel model-based AIAs specifically designed for regression tasks in FL environments. Our approach considers scenarios where adversaries can either eavesdrop on exchanged messages or directly interfere with the training process. We benchmark our proposed attacks against state-of-the-art methods using real-world datasets. The results demonstrate a significant increase in reconstruction accuracy, particularly in heterogeneous client datasets, a common scenario in FL. The efficacy of our model-based AIAs makes them better candidates for empirically quantifying privacy leakage for federated regression tasks.
Francesco Diana, Othmane Marfoq, Chuan Xu 0002, Giovanni Neglia, Frédéric Giroire, Eoin Thomas
AAAI1
2025 Cutting Through Privacy: A Hyperplane-Based Data Reconstruction Attack in Federated Learning
abstract
Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training of machine learning models across distributed clients without sharing raw data, ostensibly preserving data privacy. Nevertheless, recent studies have revealed critical vulnerabilities in FL, showing that a malicious central server can manipulate model updates to reconstruct clients’ private training data. Existing data reconstruction attacks have important limitations: they often rely on assumptions about the clients’ data distribution or their efficiency significantly degrades when batch sizes exceed just a few tens of samples. In this work, we introduce a novel data reconstruction attack that overcomes these limitations. Our method leverages a new geometric perspective on fully connected layers to craft malicious model parameters, enabling the perfect recovery of arbitrarily large data batches in classification tasks without any prior knowledge of clients’ data. Through extensive experiments on both image and tabular datasets, we demonstrate that our attack outperforms existing methods and achieves perfect reconstruction of data batches two orders of magnitude larger than the state of the art.
Francesco Diana, André Nusser, Chuan Xu 0002, Giovanni Neglia
UAI1