Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Francesco Diana
dblp:393/3176
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Efficient and distributed learning · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Privacy and data protection › inference attack
attribute inference attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning
federated learning privacy |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
privacy leakage quantification |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression Tasks · AAAI 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
reconstruction attack · 1.7model-based attack · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Attribute Inference Attacks for Federated Regression TasksabstractFederated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients, such as mobile phones and IoT devices, to collaboratively train a global machine learning model while keeping their data localized. However, recent studies have revealed that the training phase of FL is vulnerable to reconstruction attacks, such as attribute inference attacks (AIA), where adversaries exploit exchanged messages and auxiliary public information to uncover sensitive attributes of targeted clients. While these attacks have been extensively studied in the context of classification tasks, their impact on regression tasks remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by proposing novel model-based AIAs specifically designed for regression tasks in FL environments. Our approach considers scenarios where adversaries can either eavesdrop on exchanged messages or directly interfere with the training process. We benchmark our proposed attacks against state-of-the-art methods using real-world datasets. The results demonstrate a significant increase in reconstruction accuracy, particularly in heterogeneous client datasets, a common scenario in FL. The efficacy of our model-based AIAs makes them better candidates for empirically quantifying privacy leakage for federated regression tasks. Francesco Diana, Othmane Marfoq, Chuan Xu 0002, Giovanni Neglia, Frédéric Giroire, Eoin Thomas |
AAAI | 1 |
| 2025 | Cutting Through Privacy: A Hyperplane-Based Data Reconstruction Attack in Federated LearningabstractFederated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training of machine learning models across distributed clients without sharing raw data, ostensibly preserving data privacy. Nevertheless, recent studies have revealed critical vulnerabilities in FL, showing that a malicious central server can manipulate model updates to reconstruct clients’ private training data. Existing data reconstruction attacks have important limitations: they often rely on assumptions about the clients’ data distribution or their efficiency significantly degrades when batch sizes exceed just a few tens of samples. In this work, we introduce a novel data reconstruction attack that overcomes these limitations. Our method leverages a new geometric perspective on fully connected layers to craft malicious model parameters, enabling the perfect recovery of arbitrarily large data batches in classification tasks without any prior knowledge of clients’ data. Through extensive experiments on both image and tabular datasets, we demonstrate that our attack outperforms existing methods and achieves perfect reconstruction of data batches two orders of magnitude larger than the state of the art. Francesco Diana, André Nusser, Chuan Xu 0002, Giovanni Neglia |
UAI | 1 |