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Yunlang Cai

dblp:395/4205 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 94% Systems and software security · 6%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cyber-physical and IoT security
CAN bus reverse engineering
1.922026
FBRE: Fuzzing Based Bit-Level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · IEEE Trans. Computers 2026
On Bit-level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · DAC 2025
Cyber-physical and IoT security
vehicular network security
1.922026
FBRE: Fuzzing Based Bit-Level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · IEEE Trans. Computers 2026
On Bit-level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · DAC 2025
Cyber-physical and IoT security
automotive security
0.912025
On Bit-level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · DAC 2025
Systems and software security
reverse engineering
0.312026
FBRE: Fuzzing Based Bit-Level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus · IEEE Trans. Computers 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

signal boundary identification · 1.0fuzzing · 1.0control bit analysis · 1.0bit-level signal mapping · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 FBRE: Fuzzing Based Bit-Level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus
abstract
The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a foundational communication architecture in modern vehicles, supporting a wide range of functions, from engine control to auxiliary systems. However, lacking built-in security mechanisms makes CAN vulnerable to cyberattacks. Accurately mapping CAN signals to specific car-control actions becomes critical as it allows the detection of security breaches by pinpointing potential vulnerabilities exploited to compromise vehicular functions. Existing mapping techniques rely on CAN reverse engineering, which struggle to achieve bit-level resolution due to the huge search space of IDs and payload combinations. To address this challenge, we propose a systematic framework that includes signal boundary identification, targeted fuzz testing, and control bit analysis. Our method achieves high efficiency and precision in mapping control bits in CAN frames to car-control actions. Additionally, we developed a compact and user-friendly reverse engineering toolkit, incorporating a graphical interface to facilitate practical vehicle function testing and CAN message monitoring. Experiments on Tesla Model 3 and Leapmotor C11/C10 demonstrate that our framework is validated across different vehicle models and capable of identifying a wide range of car-control actions. Compared with previous works, our method significantly improves the resolution and automation of CAN reverse engineering.
Hanxue Shi, Yunlang Cai, Xiaohang Wang 0001, Haoting Shen, Li Lu 0008, Kui Ren 0001, Kaiwei Wu, Yinhe Shen
IEEE Trans. Computers2
2025 On Bit-level Reverse Engineering of Vehicular CAN Bus
abstract
The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is a cornerstone of modern vehicles, orchestrating functions from engine control to auxiliary systems. However, its lack of inherent security measures makes it vulnerable to cyberattacks. Accurately mapping CAN signals with car-control actions is critical for detecting security breaches, as it allows pinpointing potential vulnerabilities exploited to compromise vehicular functions. Despite this, existing CAN reverse engineering methods struggle to achieve bit-level resolution due to the huge search space of unique IDs and payload combinations. To address this challenge, we propose a systematic framework for reverse engineering CAN bus messages, achieving precise mapping of control bits in CAN frames to car-control actions. The framework was validated on Tesla Model 3, Leapmotor C10 and C11, demonstrating its versatility across different vehicle platforms. In particular, it successfully identified 43 car-control actions on the Tesla Model 3, showcasing its extensive coverage. Furthermore, its low resource consumption enables seamless integration into compact platforms like the Raspberry Pi, supporting practical deployment in real-world automotive systems.
Yunlang Cai, Hanxue Shi, Xiaohang Wang 0001, Haoting Shen, Li Lu 0008, Kui Ren 0001
DAC1