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Salam Afiouni

dblp:395/5561 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0007-7351-6517ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 86% Mathematical optimization · 14%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › zero-sum game
colonel blotto game
1.012026
Colonel Blotto with Battlefield Games · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium computation
nash equilibrium computation
1.012026
Colonel Blotto with Battlefield Games · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
zero-sum game
1.012026
Colonel Blotto with Battlefield Games · AAAI 2026
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium computation
0.912025
Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games · AAAI 2025
Mathematical optimization › discrete optimization
mixed integer linear programming
0.912025
Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games · AAAI 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
stackelberg game
0.912025
Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games · AAAI 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
security games
0.622026
Colonel Blotto with Battlefield Games · AAAI 2026
Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games · AAAI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

convex optimization · 1.0mixed integer linear programming · 0.9incremental strategy generation · 0.9double oracle · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Colonel Blotto with Battlefield Games
abstract
We study a class of two-player zero-sum Colonel Blotto games in which, after allocating soldiers across battlefields, players engage in (possibly distinct) normal-form games on each battlefield. Per-battlefield payoffs are parameterized by the soldier allocations. This generalizes the classical Blotto setting, where outcomes depend only on relative soldier allocations. We consider both discrete and continuous allocation models and examine two types of aggregate objectives: linear aggregation and worst-case battlefield value. For each setting, we analyze the existence and computability of Nash equilibrium. The general problem is not convex-concave, which limits the applicability of standard convex optimization techniques. However, we show that in several settings it is possible to reformulate the strategy space in a way where convex-concave structure is recovered. We evaluate the proposed methods on synthetic and real-world instances inspired by security applications, suggesting that our approaches scale well in practice.
Salam Afiouni, Jakub Cerný, Chun Kai Ling, Christian Kroer
AAAI1
2025 Commitment to Sparse Strategies in Two-Player Games
abstract
While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study k-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to mixed strategies with support size at most k. Finding k-sparse commitments is known to be computationally hard. We start by showing several structural properties of k-sparse solutions, including that the optimal support may vary dramatically as k increases. These results suggest that naive greedy or double-oracle-based approaches are unlikely to yield practical algorithms. We then develop a simple approach based on mixed integer linear programs (MILPs) for zero-sum games, general-sum Stackelberg games, and various forms of structured sparsity. We also propose practical algorithms for cases where one or both players have large (i.e., practically innumerable) action sets, utilizing a combination of MILPs and incremental strategy generation. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world scenarios based on security applications. In both settings, we observe that even for small support sizes, we can obtain more than 90% of the true Nash value while maintaining a reasonable runtime, demonstrating the significance of our formulation and algorithms.
Salam Afiouni, Jakub Cerný, Chun Kai Ling, Christian Kroer
AAAI1