Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have undergone rapid development, demonstrating significant potential in various fields, including logistics, military operations, and entertainment. By collaborating to form swarms, UAVs can undertake more complex tasks such as mapping and disaster relief. To address the limited flexibility of UAV swarm identity authentication and the requirement for swarm splitting during task execution, we propose a runtime threshold signature (RTS) scheme. Unlike traditional threshold signatures, RTS defers the selection of the threshold from the initialization phase to the signing phase, allowing verifiers to dynamically adjust the threshold as required, thus achieving an effective balance between efficiency and security. Moreover, the RTS has the same signature size as the Schnorr signature, which is a non-interactive threshold signature. Building on the RTS primitive, we designed a novel identity authentication scheme that supports the autonomous splitting of UAV swarms. This scheme enables secure swarm-level identity authentication while adapting naturally to dynamic swarm restructuring. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies unforgeability under the t-VCDH assumption. To evaluate its performance, we implemented our scheme in C++ on AmovLab Prometheus 600 (P600) UAVs and assessed it under varying network latency and bandwidth conditions. Comparative results with existing schemes demonstrate that our approach achieves lower computational overhead and high practical applicability. Notably, even with the threshold set to 128, the authentication process takes only 2.6 ms per UAV.

In unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) scenarios, the execution of specific flight missions requires anonymous certificates containing multiple attributes as proof of authorization. However, existing certificate- management schemes are ineffective in achieving an optimal trade-off between verification overhead and attribute-level revocation. First, most existing schemes bind multiple attributes to a single certificate but typically lack the capability of fine-grained revocation at the individual attribute level. Second, most existing schemes rely on centralized certificate authorities, necessitating UAVs to apply for certificates from multiple regions separately when performing cross-regional access. This scenario increases the certificate management burden. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a distributed multiattribute anonymous certificate management scheme for UAVs. First, the proposed scheme integrates redactable signatures and dynamic accumulators, enabling the selective disclosure and fine-grained revocation of attributes within a single certificate. Second, the proposed scheme utilizes a distributed key-generation mechanism, enabling decentralized certificate issuance and secure management.

The rapid evolution of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has necessitated increased device interactions across various management domains. This entails devices from different domains collaborating on the same production task. This poses significant challenges for the dynamics of cross-domain authentication schemes. Traditional cross-domain authentication schemes struggle to support seamless switching between domains and face difficulties when accommodating devices that join and leave the same domain. Moreover, these schemes suffer from intricate interactions and suboptimal efficiency. To address these issues, we propose a dynamic group signature scheme based on a dynamic accumulator and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. We integrated this scheme with blockchain technology to construct an efficient revocation cross-domain authentication scheme. The proposed scheme enables cross-domain anonymous authentication with simple interactions and provides an efficient revocation function for illegal devices. This approach ensures conditional privacy-preserving and enables efficient member joining and exiting through a dynamic accumulator. It effectively addresses the dynamic requirements of devices involved in IIoT production and manufacturing processes. We prove the security of the proposed scheme using a random Oracle model and conduct thorough analyses to verify its resistance against various attacks. Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves better performance in terms of computational and communication costs.