EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Caleb Manicke
dblp:396/3342
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0007-6409-5343ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Biometric security · 52% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 32% Security and privacy of machine learning · 16% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
3D vision · 67% Trustworthy machine learning · 33% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Advancing Adversarial Robustness in GNeRFs: The IL2-NeRF Attack · CVPR 2025 |
Computer vision › 3D vision › neural radiance field
generalizable neural radiance field |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Advancing Adversarial Robustness in GNeRFs: The IL2-NeRF Attack · CVPR 2025 |
Computer vision › 3D vision
neural radiance field |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Advancing Adversarial Robustness in GNeRFs: The IL2-NeRF Attack · CVPR 2025 |
Biometric security
biometric authentication |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Biometric security › biometric template protection
biometric key generation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
fuzzy extractor |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Biometric security
iris recognition |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › key generation
key derivation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Biometric security
biometric template protection |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris · CCS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
convolutional neural network · 1.7adversarial machine learning · 1.7l2 threat model · 0.9fuzzy extractor construction · 0.9adversarial perturbation · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Busting the Paper Ballot: Voting Meets Adversarial Machine LearningabstractWe show the security risk associated with using machine learning classifiers in United States election tabulators. The central classification task in election tabulation is deciding whether a mark does or does not appear on a bubble associated to an alternative in a contest on the ballot. Barretto et al. (E-Vote-ID 2021) reported that convolutional neural networks are a viable option in this field, as they outperform simple feature-based classifiers. Kaleel Mahmood, Caleb Manicke, Ethan Rathbun, Aayushi Verma, Sohaib Ahmad, Nicholas Stamatakis, Laurent D. Michel, Benjamin Fuller 0001 |
CCS | 2 |
| 2025 | Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the IrisabstractDespite decades of effort, a persistent chasm has existed between the theory and practice of device-level biometric authentication. Theoretical constructions can, in principle, provide biometric authentication with cryptographically secure public enrollment data. However, concrete implementations of these techniques have failed to provide security with real-world parameters. The result is that deployed authentication algorithms rely on data that overtly leaks private information about the biometric; thus systems rely on externalized security measures such as trusted execution environments. Amey Shukla, Luke Demarest, Benjamin Fuller 0001, Sohaib Ahmad, Caleb Manicke, Alexander Russell |
CCS | 5 |
| 2025 | Advancing Adversarial Robustness in GNeRFs: The IL2-NeRF AttackabstractGeneralizable Neural Radiance Fields (GNeRF) are recognized as one of the most promising techniques for novel view synthesis and 3D model generation in real-world applications. However, like other generative models in computer vision, ensuring their adversarial robustness against various threat models is essential for practical use. The pioneering work in this area, NeRFool, introduced a state-of-the-art attack that targets GNeRFs by manipulating source views before feature extraction, successfully disrupting the color and density results of the constructed views. Building on this foundation, we propose IL2-NeRF (Iterative L2NeRF Attack), a novel adversarial attack method that explores a new threat model (in the L2domain) for attacking GNeRFs. We evaluated IL2-NeRF against two standard GNeRF models across three benchmark datasets, demonstrating similar performance compared to NeRFool, based on the same evaluation metrics proposed by NeRFool. Our results establish IL2-NeRF as the first adversarial method for GNeRFs under the L2norm. We establish a foundational L2threat model for future research, enabling direct performance comparisons while introducing a smoother, image-wide perturbation approach in Adversarial 3D Reconstruction. Our code is available at: https://github.com/The-NRC-SCAR-Group/IL2-NeRF Nicole Meng 0002, Caleb Manicke, Ronak Sahu, Caiwen Ding, Yingjie Lao |
CVPR | 2 |