Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Zhenhu Wu
dblp:396/6960
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Trustworthy machine learning · 50% Autonomous driving · 25% 3D vision · 25% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning › physical adversarial attack
adversarial patch attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024 |
Computer vision › 3D vision › depth estimation
monocular depth estimation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024 |
Robotics › Autonomous driving
perception |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth Estimation · NeurIPS 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
road marking camouflage · 0.8adversarial patch · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Beware of Road Markings: A New Adversarial Patch Attack to Monocular Depth EstimationabstractMonocular Depth Estimation (MDE) enables the prediction of scene depths from a single RGB image, having been widely integrated into production-grade autonomous driving systems, e.g., Tesla Autopilot. Current adversarial attacks to MDE models focus on attaching an optimized adversarial patch to a designated obstacle. Although effective, this approach presents two inherent limitations: its reliance on specific obstacles and its limited malicious impact. In contrast, we propose a pioneering attack to MDE models that \textit{decouples obstacles from patches physically and deploys optimized patches on roads}, thereby extending the attack scope to arbitrary traffic participants. This approach is inspired by our groundbreaking discovery: \textit{various MDE models with different architectures, trained for autonomous driving, heavily rely on road regions} when predicting depths for different obstacles. Based on this discovery, we design the Adversarial Road Marking (AdvRM) attack, which camouflages patches as ordinary road markings and deploys them on roads, thereby posing a continuous threat within the environment. Experimental results from both dataset simulations and real-world scenarios demonstrate that AdvRM is effective, stealthy, and robust against various MDE models, achieving about 1.507 of Mean Relative Shift Ratio (MRSR) over 8 MDE models. The code is available at \url{https://github.com/a-c-a-c/AdvRM.git} Hangcheng Liu, Zhenhu Wu, Hao Wang 0003, Xingshuo Han, Shangwei Guo, Tao Xiang 0001, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
NeurIPS | 2 |