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Haon Park

dblp:399/6612 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
3 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 52% Language models and text generation · 33% Vision and language · 15%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 88% Systems and software security · 12%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
fairness
1.012026
COMPASS: A Framework for Evaluating Organization-Specific Policy Alignment in LLMs · ACL (1) 2026
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model evaluation
1.012026
COMPASS: A Framework for Evaluating Organization-Specific Policy Alignment in LLMs · ACL (1) 2026
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety
0.912025
One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
safety evaluation
0.912025
ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety › content safety
toxicity analysis
0.912025
ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025
Computer vision › Vision and language
vision-language model
0.912025
ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.912025
One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › jailbreak attack
jailbreak prompts
0.912025
One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
red teaming
0.312025
One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.312025
One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

prompt reformatting · 1.7multi-turn to single-turn conversion · 1.7toxicity scoring · 0.9automated evaluation · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 COMPASS: A Framework for Evaluating Organization-Specific Policy Alignment in LLMs
abstract
Dasol Choi, DongGeon Lee, Brigitta Jesica Kartono, Helena Berndt, Taeyoun Kwon, Joonwon Jang, Haon Park, Hwanjo Yu, Minsuk Kahng. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026.
Dasol Choi, DongGeon Lee, Brigitta Jesica Kartono, Helena Berndt, Taeyoun Kwon, Joonwon Jang, Haon Park, Hwanjo Yu, Minsuk Kahng
ACL (1)7
2025 One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs
abstract
We introduce a novel framework for consolidating multi-turn adversarial ``jailbreak'' prompts into single-turn queries, significantly reducing the manual overhead required for adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs). While multi-turn human jailbreaks have been shown to yield high attack success rates, they demand considerable human effort and time. Our multi-turn-to-single-turn (M2S) methods -- Hyphenize, Numberize, and Pythonize -- systematically reformat multi-turn dialogues into structured single-turn prompts. Despite removing iterative back-and-forth interactions, these prompts preserve and often enhance adversarial potency: in extensive evaluations on the Multi-turn Human Jailbreak (MHJ) dataset, M2S methods achieve attack success rates from 70.6 percent to 95.9 percent across several state-of-the-art LLMs. Remarkably, the single-turn prompts outperform the original multi-turn attacks by as much as 17.5 percentage points while cutting token usage by more than half on average. Further analysis shows that embedding malicious requests in enumerated or code-like structures exploits ``contextual blindness'', bypassing both native guardrails and external input-output filters. By converting multi-turn conversations into concise single-turn prompts, the M2S framework provides a scalable tool for large-scale red teaming and reveals critical weaknesses in contemporary LLM defenses.
Junwoo Ha, Sangyoon Yu, Haon Park, Ashkan Yousefpour, Yuna Park, Suhyun Kim 0001
ACL (1)4
2025 ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety
abstract
Current Vision Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to malicious prompts that induce harmful outputs. Existing safety benchmarks for VLMs primarily rely on automated evaluation methods, but these methods struggle to detect implicit harmful content or produce inaccurate evaluations. Therefore, we found that existing benchmarks have low levels of harmfulness, ambiguous data, and limited diversity in image-text pair combinations. To address these issues, we propose the ELITE benchmark, a high-quality safety evaluation benchmark for VLMs, underpinned by our enhanced evaluation method, the ELITE evaluator. The ELITE evaluator explicitly incorporates a toxicity score to accurately assess harmfulness in multimodal contexts, where VLMs often provide specific, convincing, but unharmful descriptions of images. We filter out ambiguous and low-quality image-text pairs from existing benchmarks using the ELITE evaluator and generate diverse combinations of safe and unsafe image-text pairs. Our experiments demonstrate that the ELITE evaluator achieves superior alignment with human evaluations compared to prior automated methods, and the ELITE benchmark offers enhanced benchmark quality and diversity. By introducing ELITE, we pave the way for safer, more robust VLMs, contributing essential tools for evaluating and mitigating safety risks in real-world applications.
Doehyeon Lee, Eugene Choi, Sangyoon Yu, Ashkan Yousefpour, Haon Park, Bumsub Ham, Suhyun Kim 0001
ICML6