Decryption errors play a crucial role in the security of KEMs based on Fujisaki-Okamoto because the concrete security guarantees provided by this transformation directly depend on the probability of such an event being bounded by a small real number. In this paper we present an approach to formally verify the claims of statistical probabilistic bounds for incorrect decryption in lattice-based KEM constructions. Our main motivating example is the PKE encryption scheme underlying ML-KEM. We formalize the statistical event that is used in the literature to heuristically approximate ML-KEM decryption errors and confirm that the upper bounds given in the literature for this event are correct. We consider FrodoKEM as an additional example, to demonstrate the wider applicability of the approach and the verification of a correctness bound without heuristic approximations. We also discuss other (non-approximate) approaches to bounding the probability of ML-KEM decryption.