EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Alvin E. Roth
dblp:40/4003
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-8834-6481ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 2 first-authorTheory of computation · 2 · 1 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Privacy and data protection · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Multi-agent systems · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
market design |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Market Design and Computerized Marketplaces · KDD 2018 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design › matching markets
kidney exchange |
0.3 | 2 | 2013 | Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here · EC 2013 Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange · EC 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design
matching markets |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here · EC 2013 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
individual rationality |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange · EC 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
matching mechanism |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange · EC 2011 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange · EC 2011 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems
multi-agent learning |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models · Artif. Intell. 2007 |
Medical and health informatics › health-care delivery system › healthcare operations
organ allocation |
0.0 | 1 | 2013 | Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here · EC 2013 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
survey · 0.3market design · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Market Design and Computerized MarketplacesabstractMarkets and marketplaces are ancient human artifacts, but in recent years they have become ever more important. In part this is because marketplaces are becoming computerized. Together with the introduction of smart phones, this also makes them ubiquitous. We can order car rides to the airport, plane rides to London, and hotel rooms for when we arrive, all on our smartphones. And as we do so we leave a data trail that is easily combined with other streams of data. This is changing not only how we interact with markets, but also how we manage and regard privacy. I'll discuss some recent developments in computerized markets and speculate about some still to come. Alvin E. Roth |
KDD | 1 |
| 2013 | Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from hereabstractI'll give an overview of the growth of kidney exchange and of the computational, economic, and behavioral issues that arise. Kidney exchange has grown into an enterprise involving many hospitals and overlapping exchange networks, and in the process the set of strategic players has changed, and so has the patient pool. I'll discuss how the market design has evolved to keep pace with these changes, and further challenges that remain, for the medical community, for economists, and for computer scientists. Alvin E. Roth |
EC | 1 |
| 2011 | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchangeabstractAs multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. Itai Ashlagi, Alvin E. Roth |
EC | 2 |
| 2007 | Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models
Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth |
Artif. Intell. | 2 |