Giving ISPs more fine-grain control over interdomain routing policies would help them better manage their networks and offer value-added services to their customers. Unfortunately, the current BGP route-selection process imposes inherent restrictions on the policies an ISP can configure, making many useful policies infeasible. In this paper, we present Morpheus, a routing control platform that is designed for configurability. Morpheus enables a single ISP to safely realize a much broader range of routing policies without requiring changes to the underlying routers or the BGP protocol itself. Morpheus allows network operators to: (1) make flexible trade-offs between policy objectives through a weighted-sum based decision process, (2) realize customer-specific policies by supporting multiple route-selection processes in parallel, and allowing customers to influence the decision processes, and (3) configure the decision processes through a simple and intuitive configuration interface based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process, a decision-theoretic technique for balancing conflicting objectives. We also present the design, implementation, and evaluation of Morpheus as an extension to the XORP software router.

Despite the pressing need to secure routing, none of the existing secure variants of BGP has been widely deployed. Due to the size and decentralized nature of the Internet, it became clear that any viable secure routing protocol must offer benefits also in its early stages of deployment. In order to determine when the protocols are not adoptable, we quantify the benefits offered by a partial deployment of an Idealized Secure BGP which is able to detect malicious routes with perfect accuracy. We also quantify the benefits of an imperfect version of the protocol. Subsequently, we conclude that even the best protocols which simply detect and avoid bogus routes do not offer good security performance except in limited scenarios. We offer alternative designs, and hope that our insights will result in a new secure routing protocol that will be more attractive to early adopters.

Network routing in wireless ad hoc networks is liable to attacks that may have a grave impact on network operations. Such attacks can be targeted at the route discovery process or the data packet forwarding process. Although the protection of route discovery is a critical prerequisite to ensure the robustness of the routing process, secured route discovery by no means eliminates attacks on routing. We, accordingly, propose a secure data forwarding protocol that detects faulty links in the packet forwarding process, which enables the corresponding sources to progressively route packets over non-faulty paths.

In this paper, we consider the problem of routing in an adversarial environment, where a sophisticated adversary has penetrated arbitrary parts of the routing infrastructure and attempts to disrupt routing. We present protocols that are able to route packets as long as at least one nonfaulty path exists between the source and the destination. These protocols have low communication overhead, low processing requirements, low incremental cost, and fast fault detection. We also present extensions to the protocols that penalize adversarial routers by blocking their traffic.

Code mobility and mobile agents have received a lot of attention as a paradigm based on which distributed applications can be built. There has been little work however on the mathematical modeling of component mobility. In this direction, we present and analyze three optimization models for component mobility. We are seeking the optimal allocation of components to network nodes and the optimal component routes that will minimize the network traffic that is incurred in the course of component communication. Optimal solutions are found either through a mixed binary integer programming formulation or by employing max flow computations. Complexity results are also reported.