Palash Dey

dblp:40/7987 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
36ranked-venue papers
22as first author
18since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-0071-9464ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 21 · 14 first-author · 13 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 13 · 8 first-author · 4 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 10 · 8 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Maximizing Value in Challenge the Champ Tournaments
Umang Bhaskar, Juhi Chaudhary, Palash Dey
AAMAS3
2025 Voter Participation Control in Online Polls
Koustav De, Palash Dey, Swagato Sanyal
AAMAS2
2025 Recognizing and eliciting weakly single crossing profiles on trees
Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2024 Knapsack with Vertex Cover, Set Cover, and Hitting Set
abstract
Given an undirected graph $\mathcal{G}=(\mathcal{V},\mathcal{E})$, with vertex weights $(w(u))_{u\in\mathcal{V}}$, vertex values $(α(u))_{u\in\mathcal{V}}$, a knapsack size $s$, and a target value $d$, the \vcknapsack problem is to determine if there exists a subset $\mathcal{U}\subseteq\mathcal{V}$ of vertices such that $\mathcal{U}$ forms a vertex cover, $w(\mathcal{U})=\sum_{u\in\mathcal{U}} w(u) \le s$, and $α(\mathcal{U})=\sum_{u\in\mathcal{U}} α(u) \ge d$. In this paper, we closely study the \vcknapsack problem and its variations, such as \vcknapsackbudget, \minimalvcknapsack, and \minimumvcknapsack, for both general graphs and trees. We first prove that the \vcknapsack problem belongs to the complexity class \NPC and then study the complexity of the other variations. We generalize the problem to \setc and \hs versions and design polynomial time $H_g$-factor approximation algorithm for the \setckp problem and d-factor approximation algorithm for \hstp using primal dual method. We further show that \setcks and \hsmb are hard to approximate in polynomial time. Additionally, we develop a fixed parameter tractable algorithm running in time $8^{\mathcal{O}({\rm tw})}\cdot n\cdot {\sf min}\{s,d\}$ where ${\rm tw},s,d,n$ are respectively treewidth of the graph, the size of the knapsack, the target value of the knapsack, and the number of items for the \minimalvcknapsack problem.
Palash Dey, Ashlesha Hota, Sudeshna Kolay, Sipra Singh
ISAAC1
2024 Knapsack: Connectedness, Path, and Shortest-Path
Palash Dey, Sudeshna Kolay, Sipra Singh
LATIN (2)1
2024 On Binary Networked Public Goods Game with Altruism
Arnab Maiti, Palash Dey
LATIN (2)2
2024 Parameterized aspects of distinct Kemeny rank aggregation
Koustav De, Harshil Mittal, Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
Acta Informatica3
2024 On Parameterized Complexity of Binary Networked Public Goods Game
Arnab Maiti, Palash Dey
Algorithmica2
2024 Query complexity of tournament solutions
Arnab Maiti, Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.2
2023 On the exact amount of missing information that makes finding possible winners hard
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.1
2023 Priced Gerrymandering
Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2023 How hard is safe bribery?
Neel Karia, Faraaz Mallick, Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.3
2022 Parameterized Algorithms for Kidney Exchange
abstract
In kidney exchange programs, multiple patient-donor pairs each of whom are otherwise incompatible, exchange their donors to receive compatible kidneys. The Kidney Exchange problem is typically modelled as a directed graph where every vertex is either an altruistic donor or a pair of patient and donor; directed edges are added from a donor to its compatible patients. The computational task is to find if there exists a collection of disjoint cycles and paths starting from altruistic donor vertices of length at most l_c and l_p respectively that covers at least some specific number t of non-altruistic vertices (patients). We study parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem in this paper. Specifically, we design FPT algorithms parameterized by each of the following parameters: (1) the number of patients who receive kidney, (2) treewidth of the input graph + max{l_p, l_c}, and (3) the number of vertex types in the input graph when l_p <= l_c. We also present interesting algorithmic and hardness results on the kernelization complexity of the problem. Finally, we present an approximation algorithm for an important special case of Kidney Exchange.
Arnab Maiti, Palash Dey
IJCAI2
2021 Fair Partitioning of Public Resources: Redrawing District Boundary to Minimize Spatial Inequality in School Funding
abstract
Public schools in the United States offer tuition-free primary and secondary education to their students, and are divided into school districts funded by the local and state governments. Although the primary source of school district revenue is public money, several studies have pointed to the inequality in funding across different school districts. In this paper, we focus on the spatial geometry/distribution of such inequality, i.e., how the highly funded and lesser funded school districts are located relative to each other. Due to the major reliance on local property taxes for school funding, we find existing school district boundaries promoting financial segregation, with highly-funded school districts surrounded by lesser-funded districts and vice-versa.
Nuno Mota, Negar Mohammadi, Palash Dey, Krishna P. Gummadi, Abhijnan Chakraborty
WWW3
2021 Predicting winner and estimating margin of victory in elections using sampling
Arnab Bhattacharyya 0001, Palash Dey
Artif. Intell.2
2021 Distance restricted manipulation in voting
Aditya Anand 0001, Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.2
2021 Local distance constrained bribery in voting
Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2021 A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
abstract
We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting. In both the problems, the input is a set of voter groups (every voter group is a set of votes) and two integers k_a and k_d corresponding to respectively the number of voter groups the attacker can attack and the number of voter groups the defender can defend. A voter group gets removed from the election if it is attacked but not defended. In the optimal defense problem, we want to know if it is possible for the defender to commit to a strategy of defending at most k_d voter groups such that, no matter which k_a voter groups the attacker attacks, the out-come of the election does not change. In the optimal attack problem, we want to know if it is possible for the attacker to commit to a strategy of attacking k_a voter groups such that, no matter which k_d voter groups the defender defends, the outcome of the election is always different from the original (without any attack) one. We show that both the optimal defense problem and the optimal attack problem are computationally intractable for every scoring rule and the Condorcet voting rule even when we have only3candidates. We also show that the optimal defense problem for every scoring rule and the Condorcet voting rule is W[2]-hard for both the parameters k_a and k_d, while it admits a fixed parameter tractable algorithm parameterized by the combined parameter (ka, kd). The optimal attack problem for every scoring rule and the Condorcet voting rule turns out to be much harder – it is W[1]-hard even for the combined parameter (ka, kd). We propose two greedy algorithms for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem and empirically show that they perform effectively on reasonable voting profiles.
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Swaprava Nath, Garima Shakya
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2020 On the Complexity of Winner Verification and Candidate Winner for Multiwinner Voting Rules
abstract
The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively, Monroe) dissatisfaction score of at most r is known to be NP-complete. We consider the following natural problems in this setting: a) given a committee S of size k as input, is it an optimal k-sized committee?, and b) given a candidate c and a committee size k, does there exist an optimal k-sized committee that contains c? In this work, we resolve the complexity of both problems for the Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe voting rules in the settings of rankings as well as approval ballots. We show that verifying if a given committee is optimal is coNP-complete whilst the latter problem is complete for Theta_2^P. Our contribution fills an essential gap in the literature for these important multi-winner rules.
Chinmay Sonar, Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
IJCAI2
2020 Improved Explicit Data Structures in the Bit-Probe Model Using Error-Correcting Codes
abstract
We consider the bit-probe complexity of the set membership problem: represent an n-element subset S of an m-element universe as a succinct bit vector so that membership queries of the form "Is x ∈ S" can be answered using at most t probes into the bit vector. Let s(m,n,t) (resp. s_N(m,n,t)) denote the minimum number of bits of storage needed when the probes are adaptive (resp. non-adaptive). Lewenstein, Munro, Nicholson, and Raman (ESA 2014) obtain fully-explicit schemes that show that s(m,n,t) = 𝒪((2^t-1)m^{1/(t - min{2⌊log n⌋, n-3/2})}) for n ≥ 2,t ≥ ⌊log n⌋+1 . In this work, we improve this bound when the probes are allowed to be superlinear in n, i.e., when t ≥ Ω(nlog n), n ≥ 2, we design fully-explicit schemes that show that s(m,n,t) = 𝒪((2^t-1)m^{1/(t-{n-1}/{2^{t/(2(n-1))}})}), asymptotically (in the exponent of m) close to the non-explicit upper bound on s(m,n,t) derived by Radhakrishan, Shah, and Shannigrahi (ESA 2010), for constant n. In the non-adaptive setting, it was shown by Garg and Radhakrishnan (STACS 2017) that for a large constant n₀, for n ≥ n₀, s_N(m,n,3) ≥ √{mn}. We improve this result by showing that the same lower bound holds even for storing sets of size 2, i.e., s_N(m,2,3) ≥ Ω(√m).
Palash Dey, Jaikumar Radhakrishnan, Santhoshini Velusamy
MFCS1
2019 A Parameterized Perspective on Protecting Elections
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Swaprava Nath, Garima Shakya
IJCAI1
2019 An Optimal Algorithm for ℓ1-Heavy Hitters in Insertion Streams and Related Problems
abstract
We give the first optimal bounds for returning the ℓ 1 -heavy hitters in a data stream of insertions, together with their approximate frequencies, closing a long line of work on this problem. For a stream of m items in { 1, 2, … , n } and parameters 0 < ε < φ ⩽ 1, let f i denote the frequency of item i , i.e., the number of times item i occurs in the stream. With arbitrarily large constant probability, our algorithm returns all items i for which f i ⩾ φ m , returns no items j for which f j ⩽ (φ −ε) m , and returns approximations f˜ i with | f˜ i − f i | ⩽ ε m for each item i that it returns. Our algorithm uses O (ε −1 log φ −1 + φ −1 log n + log log m ) bits of space, processes each stream update in O (1) worst-case time, and can report its output in time linear in the output size. We also prove a lower bound, which implies that our algorithm is optimal up to a constant factor in its space complexity. A modification of our algorithm can be used to estimate the maximum frequency up to an additive ε m error in the above amount of space, resolving Question 3 in the IITK 2006 Workshop on Algorithms for Data Streams for the case of ℓ 1 -heavy hitters. We also introduce several variants of the heavy hitters and maximum frequency problems, inspired by rank aggregation and voting schemes, and show how our techniques can be applied in such settings. Unlike the traditional heavy hitters problem, some of these variants look at comparisons between items rather than numerical values to determine the frequency of an item.
Arnab Bhattacharyya 0001, Palash Dey, David P. Woodruff
ACM Trans. Algorithms2
2019 Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2018 Manipulative Elicitation - A New Attack on Elections with Incomplete Preferences
abstract
Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that such an approach is vulnerable to a new kind of manipulation which was not present in the classical (where preferences are complete orders) world of voting. We call this attack "manipulative elicitation." More specifically, it may be possible to (partially) elicit the preferences of the agents in a way that makes some distinguished alternative win the election who may not be a winner if we elicit every preference completely. More alarmingly, we show that the related computational task is polynomial time solvable for a large class of voting rules which includes all scoring rules, maximin, Copeland α for every α ∈ [0,1], simplified Bucklin voting rules, etc. We then show that introducing a parameter per pair of alternatives which specifies the minimum number of partial preferences where this pair of alternatives must be comparable makes the related computational task of manipulative elicitation NP-complete for all common voting rules including a class of scoring rules which includes the plurality, k-approval, k-veto, veto, and Borda voting rules, maximin, Copeland α for every α ∈ [0,1], and simplified Bucklin voting rules. Hence, in this work, we discover a fundamental vulnerability in using minimax regret based approach in partial preferential setting and propose a novel way to tackle it.
Palash Dey
AAAI1
2018 Manipulative elicitation - A new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
Palash Dey
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2018 Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2017 Query Complexity of Tournament Solutions
abstract
A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices is called a tournament. Finding the “best” set of vertices of a tournament is a well studied problem in social choice theory. A tournament solution takes a tournamentas input and outputs a subset of vertices of the input tournament. However, in many applications, for example, choosing the best set of drugs from a given set of drugs, the edges of the tournament are given only implicitly and knowing the orientation of an edge is costly. In such scenarios, we would like to know the best set of vertices (according to some tournament solution) by “querying” as few edges as possible. We, in this paper, precisely study this problem for commonly used tournament solutions: given an oracle access to the edges of a tournament T , find f(T) by querying as few edges as possible, for a tournament solution f. We first show that the set of Condorcet non-losers in a tournament can be found by querying 2n−⌊log n⌋−2 edges only and this is tight in the sense that every algorithm for finding the set of Condorcet non-losers needs to query at least 2n−⌊log n⌋−2 edges in the worst case, where n is the number of vertices in the input tournament. We then move on to study other popular tournament solutions and show that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, the Banks set, and the top cycle must query Ω(n2) edges in the worst case. On the positive side, we are able to circumvent our strong query complexity lower bound results by proving that, if the size of the top cycle of the input tournament is at most k, then we can find all the tournament solutions mentioned above by querying O(nk + n log n / log(1− 1 / k ) ) edges only.
Palash Dey
AAAI1
2017 On the Exact Amount of Missing Information that Makes Finding Possible Winners Hard
abstract
This thesis is in the area called computational social choice which is an intersection area of algorithms and social choice theory.
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
MFCS1
2017 Frugal bribery in voting
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2016 Frugal Bribery in Voting
abstract
Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We introduce and study two important special cases of the bribery problem, namely, FRUGAL-BRIBERY and FRUGAL-$BRIBERY where the briber is frugal in nature. By this, we mean that the briber is only able to influence voters who benefit from the suggestion of the briber. More formally, a voter is vulnerable if the outcome of the election improves according to her own preference when she accepts the suggestion of the briber. In the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes. In the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint. We show that both the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems are intractable for many commonly used voting rules for weighted as well as unweighted elections. These intractability results demonstrate that bribery is a hard computational problem, in the sense that several special cases of this problem continue to be computationally intractable. This strengthens the view that bribery, although a possible attack on an election in principle, may be infeasible in practice.
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
AAAI1
2016 Elicitation for Preferences Single Peaked on Trees
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
IJCAI1
2016 Preference Elicitation for Single Crossing Domain
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra
IJCAI1
2016 Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
IJCAI1
2016 An Optimal Algorithm for l1-Heavy Hitters in Insertion Streams and Related Problems
abstract
We give the first optimal bounds for returning the l1-heavy hitters in a data stream of insertions, together with their approximate frequencies, closing a long line of work on this problem. For a stream of m items in {1, 2, ..., n} and parameters 0 < ε < φ ≤ 1, let fi denote the frequency of item i, i.e., the number of times item i occurs in the stream. With arbitrarily large constant probability, our algorithm returns all items i for which fi ≥ φ m, returns no items j for which fj ≤ (φ -ε)m, and returns approximations ~fi with |~fi - fi| ≤ ε m for each item i that it returns. Our algorithm uses O(ε-1 logφ-1 + φ-1 log n + log log m) bits of space, processes each stream update in O(1) worst-case time, and can report its output in time linear in the output size. We also prove a lower bound, which implies that our algorithm is optimal up to a constant factor in its space complexity. A modification of our algorithm can be used to estimate the maximum frequency up to an additive ε m error in the above amount of space, resolving Question 3 in the IITK 2006 Workshop on Algorithms for Data Streams for the case of l1-heavy hitters. We also introduce several variants of the heavy hitters and maximum frequency problems, inspired by rank aggregation and voting schemes, and show how our techniques can be applied in such settings. Unlike the traditional heavy hitters problem, some of these variants look at comparisons between items rather than numerical values to determine the frequency of an item.
Arnab Bhattacharyya 0001, Palash Dey, David P. Woodruff
PODS2
2016 Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari 0001
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2015 Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election Using Sampling
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari 0001
IJCAI1