With the prevalence of CMOS cameras in many computer vision applications, there is an increase in the appearance of rolling shutter (RS) artifacts in captured videos. However, existing video super-resolution algorithms assume that the motion is globally consistent in each video frame and no rolling shutter effect is present. The problem of video super-resolution for video captured using RS cameras is challenging as the model needs to learn the row-wise local pixel displacements and the global structure of the frame for RS correction and super-resolution, simultaneously. Different from existing works, we address a more realistic problem of joint rolling shutter correction and super-resolution (RS-SR). We introduce a novel architecture, deformable Patch Attention Network (PatchNet), that utilizes patch-recurrence property along with deformable receptive fields to learn the global and local structure of the video. Specifically, PatchNet leverages bi-directional motion field in the feature space to extract relevant information from neighboring patches using attention mechanism, and deformable fields using deformable convolutions to extract local pixel-level information for joint rolling shutter correction and super-resolution. Our work is the first to tackle the task of RS correction and super-resolution on the recently released BS-RSCD dataset. Experiments on the BS-RSCD and FastecRS datasets demonstrate that our model performs favorably against various state-of-the-art approaches. Project details are available at https://akashagupta.com/publication/wacv23_patchnet/project.html

We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. We study the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the terminals in this scenario by modeling it as a noncooperative game among the terminals. The degradation in performance due to the lack of regulation is measured by the Price of Anarchy (POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Wardrop equilibrium and the socially optimum cost. Our main result is that in contrast with the case of independent sources, the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the price of anarchy. Toward establishing this result, we first characterize the socially optimal flow and rate allocation in terms of four intuitive conditions. Next, we show that the Wardrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we construct explicit examples that demonstrate that the POA >; 1 and determine near-tight upper bounds on the POA as well. The main techniques in our analysis are Lagrangian duality theory and the usage of the supermodularity of conditional entropy.