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Anthony Boswell

dblp:40/995 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1995
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Requirements engineering and software design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
multilevel security		 0.011995
Specification and Validation of a Security Policy Model · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995
Systems and software security › formal security model
security policy model		 0.011995
Specification and Validation of a Security Policy Model · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995
Requirements engineering and software design
formal specification		 0.011995
Specification and Validation of a Security Policy Model · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995
Requirements engineering and software design › formal specification
z specification		 0.011995
Specification and Validation of a Security Policy Model · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1995

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal validation · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1995 Specification and Validation of a Security Policy Model
abstract
The paper describes the development of a formal security policy model in Z for the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS): a large, distributed, multilevel-secure system. The model was subject to manual validation, and some of the issues and lessons in both writing and validating the model are discussed.>
Anthony Boswell
 IEEE Trans. Software Eng.1